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POLITICAL FEDERALISM AND
CONGRESSIONAL TRUTH-TELLING
Margaret G. Stewart *
To live in the last decade of the twentieth century is to live a world preoc-
cupied with federations, those in the process of both creation and destruc-
tion. The news media chronicles the bloody disintegration of what was once
Yugoslavia, a nation of republics, the tension in Canada caused by the un-
ceasing restlessness of the province of Quebec, and the continuing uncertain
political meaning of the new Commonwealth of Independent States.' On the
other hand, the traditionally independent nation-states of Europe continue
to move, albeit haltingly, toward greater economic union.' The proposed
North American Free Trade Agreement may signal the beginning of integra-
tion between the United States, Canada, and Mexico.' The People's Repub-
lic of China has, by treaty, accepted the notion of "one nation, two
economies" in the context of the return of Hong Kong in 1997 and has al-
ready in practice granted virtual economic independence to its "enterprises
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1. See, e.g., Steve Erlanger, Ukraine and Arms Accords: Kiev Reluctant to Say 'I Do',
N.Y. TIMES, March 31, 1993, at Al (noting the continuing political uncertainty throughout
the former Soviet Union, and its impact on the future of arms negotiations); Charles
Trueheart, Separatist's Talk Irks Minorities in Quebec, WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 28, 1993, at
A15 (discussing the recent efforts of Quebec's separatist movement to obtain independence for
the Canadian province); R.W. Apple, Jr., Diplomacy's Goal In Bosnia Seems Not Bold Action
But Avoiding It, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1993, § 4, at 14 (discussing the continuing breakup of
the former Yugoslavia and the Western allies' inability to address it).
2. See, e.g., Britain Told to Review European Unity Treaty, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1993, at
A6; William Drozdiak, France's Center-Right Foresees Painful Win; Recession, Rivalries Could
Sour Victory, WASHINGTON POST, March 19, 1993, at A47, A53 (discussing the impact of
French political turmoil on European economic unification efforts); William Drozdiak, U.S.-
European Alliance Plagued by Trade, Security Conflicts, WASHINGTON POST, February 13,
1993, at A20 (discussing recent setbacks for the European economic unity movement and their
impact on U.S.-European relations).
3. See Keith Bradsher, Trade Pact Signed in 3 Capitals, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1992, at
DI (reporting the signature by the leaders of Mexico, Canada, and the United States of the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)).
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zones."4 In these situations, the judicial role in defining relations between
parts of the entity and the whole is critical. Where this role has broken
down completely, the result has been chaos and confusion. Where it
has been accorded acceptance, political relations have proceeded more
smoothly.5 It is an historic irony that the United States, the oldest federal
republic in the world, is now one in which, internally, such judicial protec-
tion is on the wane.
The federal structure of the United States is a constitutional premise en-
trenched in its political ideology. But to recognize the legal and political
inevitability of the structure is not to determine that the role of the states
will remain meaningful. Sovereignty has two prime components: the ability
to rule or regulate the conduct of entities within the sovereign borders and
the ability to resist rule or regulation by a different sovereign.6 Since the
much-heralded demise of dual federalism in 1937,7 the states' ability to regu-
late the conduct of their citizens has been dependent upon Congress's choice
not to regulate the same conduct.' Since 1985, the states' ability to resist
4. See Steve Lahr, The Cloud Over Hong Kong, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1983, § 5 (Maga-
zine), at 26 (discussing the economic ramifications of Hong Kong's return to China).
5. Thus, judicially-defined federalism clearly plays no current role in the territories that
used to encompass Yugoslavia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. But in Canada,
where the inability of the country's provinces to agree on the constitutional status of Quebec
underlies its tensions, the role of the judiciary will significantly effect the political outcome of
that conflict. See Peter W. Hogg, Formal Amendment of the Constitution of Canada, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1992, at 253; Mary E. Williford, Recent Development, Canadian
Constitutional Law-Supreme Court of Canada Holds Consent of Quebec Not Necessary for
Amendment to Canadian Constitution, 19 TEX. INT'L L.J. 233 (1984). The Treaty of Rome
established the Court of Justice of the European Communities to hear cases brought by mem-
ber states alleging that the executive branch of the European Community exceeded its author-
ity, as well as cases brought to determine whether actions taken by member states in response
to Community directives meet the stated requirements. Treaty Establishing the European
Economic Community (Treaty of Rome), ratified Jan. 1, 1958, 298 U.N.T.S. 11. Similarly,
NAFTA provides for arbitration of disputes between the parties, though the non-binding na-
ture of the mechanism has raised at least academic concern. See Frederick M. Abbott, Inte-
gration Without Institutions." The NAFTA Mutation of the EC Model and the Future of the
GA TT Regime, 40 AM. J. COMp. LAW 917, 944-45 (1992). Finally, for what it is worth, the
joint declaration setting out the agreement between the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) and
Great Britain refers continually to legal protection of the defined parameters of the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region. A Draft Agreement Between the Government of the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's
Republic of China on the Future of Hong Kong, initialed at Peking September 26, 1984, 23
I.L.M. 1366.
6. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1396 (6th ed. 1990).
7. See, e.g., LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 239-44 (1978)
(discussing the principles of federalism as a source of judicially-enforceable limits on congres-
sional power).
8. It is difficult, if not impossible, to hypothesize conduct that, in the aggregate, does not
have a substantial effect on interstate commerce, particularly given the United States Supreme
Court's deference to such congressional findings. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. I11,
[Vol. 42:511
1993] Political Federalism
regulation of their own conduct by Congress has been left almost completely
dependent upon congressional choice.9 Thus, the judiciary no longer claims
any significant role in the protection of states from national authority. Fed-
eralism constraints no longer create certain spheres of activity within the
literal reach of Congress but outside its actual control.'" Similarly, actions
by the states themselves outside the actual though not the literal reach of
Congress's control no longer exist." Instead, the United States Supreme
123-29 (1942) (upholding limits on farm crops grown for the farmer's consumption). Profes-
sor Richard Epstein makes this point emphatically, in The Proper Scope of the Commerce
Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1451-54 (1987) (arguing for a more limited interpretation of the
United States Constitution's Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and Necessary
and Proper, id., § 8, cl. 18, Clause).9. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). Indeed, Congress
may not only regulate the states themselves, but it may also subject them to private suits for
money damages, in total derogation of historical notions of sovereign immunity. Pennsylvania
v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 10 (1989). ,
For the first time since 1976, the Supreme Court has recently struck down federal legislation
as beyond the scope of congressional power and violative of the Tenth Amendment. New
York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992). However, the extent to which New York v.
United States signals the reentry of the judiciary into the federalism arena should not be over-
stated. First, the decision is careful to distinguish Garcia and all previous federalism chal-
lenges to national regulation by noting that the statute at issue was directed only to states,
rather than to the regulation of both state and private activity. Id. at 2415-17. Dissenting
from that part of the opinion striking down the "take title" provision, Justice White, joined by
Justices Blackmun and Stevens, noted that it was hard to understand why the difference was
relevant, but that the distinction severely limited the impact of the holding. Id. at 2435
(White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Moreover, the majority, although appar-
ently unsure as to whether the Tenth Amendment provides an external restraint on Congress's
power under the Commerce Clause, focused on the lack of congressional power either to
"commandeer" state legislative processes by compelling the state itself to regulate radioactive
waste in a certain way or to transfer title to that waste from the producers to the state. Id. at
2428-30 (majority opinion). Thus, rather than acknowledging that the federal statute dealt
with activities that affected interstate commerce, thereby raising the Tenth Amendment as a
shield to protect states from being compelled to legislate or subsidize certain industries, the
Court spoke in terms of lack of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause itself. Id. at
2423. Finally,'even if that lack of authority is the result of a two-step analysis requiring refer-
ence to the tenth Amendment, the majority was very clear that anything short of a direct
order to legislate is legitimate. Id.; cf Clarke v. United States, 886 F.2d 404, 406 (D.C. Cir.
1989) (holding that the Armstrong Amendment, Pub. L. No. 100-462 § 145, 102 Stat. 2269-14
(1988), which conditioned federal funding to the District of Columbia on passage by the Dis-
trict of Columbia City Council of specified legislation, violated the Council members' First
Amendment free speech rights).
10. Although the Supreme Court in South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987), left open
the possibility that Congress could not utilize its Commerce Clause power to impose directly a
national drinking age, the Court relied on the Twenty-First rather than the Tenth Amendment
as the source of the impediment. Id. at 205-06.
11. But see New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. at 2419. Garcia left open the possibility
that certain kinds of direct regulation of the states, as states, might run afoul of the Constitu-
tion as a result of "possible failings in the national political process." Garcia, 469 U.S. at 554.
However, the Court did not identify specific examples of such a situation, see id., and none
come to mind.
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Court has told the states that their participation in the federal political pro-
cess, guaranteed by inherent procedural safeguards, assures protection of
their sovereign interests 12 and presumably the continuation of a real role in a
federation. To be sure, neither the nations of Europe nor the signatories of
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) would be reassured
by such judicial abdication. Neither are some of the states. 3
If judicial abdication in favor of political process is justifiable, it is only to
the extent that the political process in fact permits the states a meaningful
role in national decision making. 4 Academics engage in wide-ranging de-
Interestingly, the dissenters in New York v. United States looked to the political process for
justification of the challenged legislation. 112 S. Ct. at 2439-40 (White, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). The legislative scheme not only reflected a joint state-federal compro-
mise that addressed the problem of the increasing amounts of radioactive waste and the de-
creasing number of disposal sites, but also preserved a role for state choice of means. Id. New
York had participated in drafting the compromise and its Representatives and Senators had
voted in its favor. Apparently, while "failure" of the process may doom legislation, "success-
ful process" cannot save it.
Of course, the Garcia dissent did threaten a return to the regime of National League of
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). Garcia, 469 U.S. at 579-80 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In
both Garcia and Union Gas the Court split five to four, with Justice Brennan joining the ma-
jority opinion in Garcia, 469 U.S. at 529, and writing the majority opinion in Union Gas, 491
U.S. at 5. Justice Brennan's retirement from the Court, therefore, creates the possibility of
reversal for both Garcia and Union Gas. However, such reversal would do little to insulate the
states from the political will of Congress. In the years between Usery and Garcia, the Supreme
Court found no other congressional act in violation of the Tenth Amendment, and the effect of
Union Gas can easily be over-stated as well, since the Eleventh Amendment does not preclude
injunctive relief against or compelling the action of state officials, no matter what the prospec-
tive monetary cost to the state. In any event, the authority of Congress to regulate what used
to be called "local" activity is challenged today only academically, and thus the ability of the
states to act as effective governments for their citizens may be protected only politically today,
as it has been for fifty years.
12. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 552.
13. See Linda P. Campbell, States Fear More Issues Becoming a Federal Case, CHI. TRIB.,
July 15, 1990, at 5 (noting that "15 state legislatures have passed resolutions backing constitu-
tional amendments to restore some of their authority," including one which would "revise the
10th Amendment by requiring the courts to decide exactly what powers are reserved for the
states").
14. Any judicial abdication in favor of legislative choice implicates the doctrine of separa-
tion of powers, as well as the scope of various constitutional constraints on legislative action.
The current Supreme Court, in numerous contexts other than federalism, has indicated its
distaste for setting aside majoritarian choices made by state legislatures. See, e.g., Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (permitting a
greater role for state choice in passing abortion legislation); Burnham v. Superior Ct., 495 U.S.
604 (1990) (holding that due process does not preclude a state from asserting personal jurisdic-
tion over a defendant personally served with process by state). That same distaste is evidenced
in the cases addressing federalism issues, but the rationale for the failure to intervene is differ-
ent. In cases such as Burnham and Casey, the Supreme Court concluded that the state legisla-
ture was free to act because individuals who disagree with the action have no constitutional
right to be free from such action. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2824 (finding the state's action to be
reasonable); Burnham, 495 U.S. at 619 (finding the states jurisdictional requirements to be
[Vol. 42:511
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bate over the merits of the Supreme Court's assumption that it does."5 In no
event, of course, does the Supreme Court's envisioned political protection
aid a state that advocates a minority position, particularly if that state is not
politically influential on a national level. 6 In any case, assuming that pro-
tection of the role of the states in the constitutional plan is to be left to the
political process, and further assuming that the process does provide mecha-
nisms through which the states, directly or indirectly, may influence con-
gressional choices, clarity of congressional choice is essential. The Supreme
Court itself has recognized this in requiring a "clear statement" of congres-
sional intent in order to regulate the states or subject them to suit.' The
traditional justification for this requirement has been that Congress should
not be presumed to wish to interfere with state decisions about the allocation
reasonable). By contrast, in cases such as Garcia, the Court does not dispute the states' consti-
tutional right to participate in a federation. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 552-54. The Court merely
asserts that judicial protection of that right is unnecessary because states are capable of pro-
tecting themselves through the political process. Id The states, as a result of the constitu-
tional structure, presumably have more "clout" than individual voters when it comes to
protecting their rights against majority infringement. See id.; see also infra notes 15-17 and
accompanying text (discussing the states' role in the federal political process).
15. The Garcia Court adopted the argument that was posited by Herbert Wechsler in The
Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of
the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954). See also Lewis B. Kaden, Politics,
Money and State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 847 (1979) (arguing to
the contrary that the expansion of domestic programs and the public sector at large, as well as
the shifting of some cost-sharing onto the states, has increased state and local government
activity, thereby complicating the system of federalism); D. Bruce La Pierre, Political Account-
ability in the National Political Process--The Alternative to Judicial Review of Federalism Is-
sues, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 577 (1985) (arguing that the real protection from congressional over-
reaching in this context is political accountability to the electorate).
In a recent article, Professor Rose argues and celebrates the fact that "our history reflects a
tenacious and continuous countercurrent to most efforts to centralize local functions." Carol
Rose, The Ancient Constitution vs. the Federalist Empire: Anti-Federalism from the Attack on
"Monarchism" to Modern Localism, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 74, 99 (1989). Local governments,
she asserts, are distinguished from the federal government both by the realistic voice of the
citizen and by the citizen's option to leave. Id. at 97. Voice and the "exit option," id. at 99,
together permit much greater individual influence at the local level than at the national level.
Thus, she argues, it is the continuation and survival of her "countercurrent" that demands
political protection at the national level. Without such protection, citizen influence even at the
local level will be diminished as the exit option becomes less realistic in a homogenized nation.
Id. at 99-105.
16. The Garcia "loophole" addresses defects in the process itself. See supra note 11. An
individual state's challenge to regulation by Congress apparently must rest on a lack of "ple-
nary" consideration or "surreptitious" enactment unless the regulation is applicable only to
the particular state. EEOC v. Vermont, 904 F.2d 794, 802 (2d Cir. 1990) (stating that "[t]here
is no suggestion that Congress surreptitiously enacted any legislation without notice to the
State of Vermont"). Interestingly, the need for nonsurreptitious plenary consideration to as-
sure the proper functioning of the political process emphasizes the need for clarity of congres-
sional choice. See infra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
17. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 25 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring);
Garcia, 469 U.S. at 547-48.
19931
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of state funds or services, or to impose upon the states potentially large mon-
etary burdens.'" Furthermore, before working such reallocations of power
or money, Congress itself should realize the consequences of its actions in
order to assure adequate consideration of choice. A variation from this justi-
fication focuses not on Congress as decisionmaker, but on the states as deci-
sion influencers.19 Without clarity of congressional intent, it is difficult, if
not impossible, for the states to respond adequately to national regulation at
the critical moment when the regulation is still being considered. After its
adoption, the states' only recourse against unfavorable regulation is to seek
repeal, a more difficult task politically in light of opinions already formed
and justifications already adopted.2"
This Article will argue that there is a need for clarity in federal regulation
in order to make possible the protection of federalism. This clarity ought to
influence both the Supreme Court, as a matter of constitutional law, and
Congress, as a matter of both law and policy, in their interpretations of con-
gressional power derived from sources other than the grants of substantive
regulatory authority under Article I of the United States Constitution. The
thesis of this Article is not that the potential sphere of federal governmental
power should be reduced, nor that the assertion of that power is questiona-
ble, either against the states, or in areas historically left to state control.
Rather, the argument is that when federal power is asserted, it should be
asserted directly rather than indirectly. In order to assure such direct asser-
tions of power, the ability of Congress to utilize its non-regulatory powers to
spend and to create inferior federal courts in order to achieve substantive
18. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 19 (1981).
19. See Michael A. Fitts, Can Ignorance Be Bliss? Imperfect Information as a Positive
Influence in Political Institutions, 88 MICH. L. REV. 917 (1990) (arguing that voter knowledge
is not necessarily an unalloyed good). However, Professor Fitts's concern seems motivated in
large part by a perceived need to empower institutions, specifically political parties, not to
"hide the ball" in its entirety. Id. at 934-38.
20. Of course, the checkered history of the 55 mile per hour speed limit demonstrates that
the task, although difficult, is not impossible. The debate about the speed limit, however, did
not focus on which government should regulate; rather, it addressed the substance of the regu-
lation. Notwithstanding editorials in many western states, the public outcry was not in favor
of "states rights." See, e.g., Blood on the Highway, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1987, § 2, at 6
(stating in an editorial that congressional modification of speed limits was in part due to
"buckl[ing] under pressure from Western governors"). The public was in favor of a higher
speed limit, a fact nicely demonstrated by the silence which has greeted the higher, but still
congressionally "requested," 65 mile per hour rule. See Irvin Molotsky, 20 States Win the
Right to Set a 65 M.P.H. Speed, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1987, at Al (stating that "with little
fanfare," Congress allowed some states to raise certain highway speed limits); see also Air
Transp. Ass'n of Am. v. Department of Transp., 900 F.2d 369, 379-80 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (noting
a "presumption of [agency] closed-mindedness" after an agency promulgates final rules), va-
cated, 498 U.S. 1077 (1991); National Tour Brokers Ass'n v. United States, 591 F.2d 896, 902
(D.C. Cir. 1978) ("People naturally tend to be more close-minded and defensive once they
have made a 'final' determination.").
[Vol. 42:511
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ends must be reduced in the context of spending and eliminated entirely in
the context of creating courts. Only when it is completely clear to both Con-
gress and the states that federal regulation is contemplated to replace state
regulation can federalism be meaningfully protected by the political process.
I. CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY: NOT ALL POWERS
ARE CREATED EQUAL
Most congressional powers reflect the ability of the nation to regulate con-
duct directly, subject only to the strictures of amendments guaranteeing in-
dividual rights.2 When such direct regulation occurs, it is unnecessary for
Congress to identify the constitutional power pursuant to which it has acted.
If the Supreme Court believes that any one of the enumerated powers sup-
ports the legislation, the Constitution is satisfied.22 Presumably, the justifi-
cation for the rule is a practical one: if Congress mistakenly identified an
insufficient power to support its legislation, and the Supreme Court found
the law therefore to be unconstitutional, Congress could rectify its error by
subsequently repassing the statute under a sufficient constitutional source of
authority. When both the insufficient and sufficient grants of authority alleg-
edly support direct regulation of the same conduct, the judicial exercise of
invalidating the initial legislation would be futile and would result in an un-
21. While a number of enumerated powers do not literally provide for the establishment
by Congress of rules to govern conduct, regulation of conduct relevant to those grants is sup-
ported by the necessary and proper clause. See Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 732 (1877)
(holding that "[fthe power possessed by Congress [to establish post offices and postal roads]
embraces the regulation of the entire postal system of the country").
22. See Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138 (1948); see also Katzenbach v. Mc-
Clung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). Justice Douglas's concurrence in Katzenbach disputes the propri-
ety of relying on the Commerce Clause rather than the Fourteenth Amendment to uphold
the 1964 Civil Rights Act, both because individual rights should be recognized as deserving
greater constitutional protection than that afforded commerce, and because Fourteenth
Amendment analysis does not require the Court to consider the effect of local racial discrimi-
nation on interstate commerce. Id. at 317-18 (Douglas, J., concurring); see also Heart of At-
lanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 279-80 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring). The
author is aware of no other instance in which a Supreme Court Justice has indicated concern
about which regulatory power Congress has chosen to use.
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necessary expenditure of time by both Congress and the Court.23 The con-
cerns of political federalism are not implicated in this scenario.24
Despite the Supreme Court's flexibility in treatment of congressional
sources of legislative authority, there are some congressional powers that are
too inherently different to be easily interchangeable with powers that are
clearly regulatory. The power to tax and spend is not a power to regulate, a
fact long recognized and the cause of occasional judicial and academic de-
bate." Furthermore, while the power to establish tribunals inferior to the
Supreme Court is the source of some congressional regulatory authority,26
this power does not apply to the kind of conduct whose regulation is con-
templated by other clauses in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution. 7 Con-
gress's use of either of these powers to achieve regulatory results that might
admittedly be achieved by legislation enacted pursuant to usually the Com-
merce Clause does implicate concerns of political federalism. By using its
tax and spend power to regulate, Congress achieves its regulatory goal indi-
rectly rather than directly, and may consequently blunt the ability of the
states or their electorates to object effectively to new assertions of federal
control. Similarly, Congress's use of its power to establish inferior courts in
23. Similar logic led the Supreme Court to abandon an inquiry into the motive of Con-
gress in passing legislation that both regulated commerce and had a social impact beyond
Congress's power to compel without the commercial nexus. Compare McCulloch v. Mary-
land, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (inquiring into Congress's motives for establishing a na-
tional bank) with United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (upholding minimum wage and
hour laws for employees producing goods for interstate commerce). In this context, the prob-
lem of futility is compounded by the difficulty of ascertaining the actual motive for the actions
of a collective body. Congress occasionally may not specify the power that propels its action.
See Woods, 333 U.S. at 144. More frequently, the purpose behind legislation may be gleaned
only from legislative history, or that history may conflict with a self-serving preamble.
24. An illustrative hypothesis assumes that the Supreme Court would hold that Congress
could not control local housing rents pursuant to its power to declare war on the basis of the
belief that the return of servicemen from abroad caused the disruption of local rents. Cf
Woods, 333 U.S. at 144 (stating that "it is plain from the legislative history that Congress was
invoking its war power to cope with a current condition of which the war was a direct and
immediate cause"). The Court might find, however, that local rents in the aggregate have a
substantial impact on interstate commerce and, therefore, may be regulated by Congress under
the Commerce Clause. From the point of view of states attempting to protect their own auton-
omy, the threat of federally-imposed rent control is as obvious and as great, and is to be coun-
tered in the same fashion, whether Congress appeals to its war power, see Yakus v. United
States, 321 U.S. 414, 425 (1944) (upholding the power of Congress to regulate prices pursuant
to its war power), or to the Commerce Clause, see Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547-48
(1975) (holding that the Economic Stabilization Act was a valid exercise of Congress's author-
ity to regulate under the Commerce Clause).
25. Cf U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. This is not to say that regulations, justified under
another power, may not be properly attached to an appropriations bill. See United States v.
Burton, 888 F.2d 682, 685 (10th Cir. 1989) (stating that "if Congress so intends, it can amend
the provisions of a statute through the use of an appropriations act").
26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9.
27. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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order to regulate or affect conduct outside the federal courtroom may make
it more difficult for states to protect their political territory. The interpreta-
tion of congressional authority derived from these two powers and Con-
gress's ability to utilize them in lieu of others form the basis for a discussion
of congressional authority.
II. PLANTING THE SEEDS FOR CONGRESSIONAL MANIPULATION:
INDIRECT CONTROL UNDER THE SPENDING POWER
In the first part of this century, Congress sought to circumvent judicially-
imposed restrictions on its efforts to regulate local economic conduct2" by
either purchasing a state's compliance with its goals,29 or taxing the state's
non-compliance.30 However, the Supreme Court initially rejected these ef-
forts, holding that if the congressional goal was beyond Congress's direct
regulatory authority, it could not be achieved indirectly through bribery3 or
penalty. 32 Today, few regulatory goals remain beyond congressional author-
ity, save to the extent that Congress is interested in circumventing individual
rights restraints on its power. Thus, contemporary academic literature fo-
cuses on the "unconstitutional condition" problem: if Congress can not force
an individual to do or refrain from doing a certain act, may Congress none-
theless impose, as a condition of the individual's receipt of a federal grant,
the doing or not doing of that act?33 The assumption underlying this discus-
sion is that if Congress could directly force an individual to do or refrain
from doing the act, the imposition of the same condition on grant receipts, if
28. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
29. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (invalidating Congress's reliance on the
spending power to support agricultural price regulation).
30. Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922).
31. The Supreme Court recently explained the restriction in a much more limited fashion.
In South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987), Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for all but
Justices Brennan and O'Connor, stated that "the 'independent constitutional bar' limitation on
the spending power is not ... a prohibition on the indirect achievement of objectives which
Congress is not empowered to achieve directly. Instead .... the power may not be used to
induce the States to engage in activities that would themselves be unconstitutional." Id. at
210. Under this interpretation, there are few situations in which the doctrine will play a role:
Congress would not ordinarily wish states, for example, to discriminate; individuals do not act
unconstitutionally, and it is not unconstitutional for individuals to waive their constitutional
rights.
32. Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20, 37 (1922).
33. See generally Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme Court, 1987 Term-Forward: Uncon-
stitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1988);
Albert J. Rosenthal, Conditional Federal Spending and the Constitution, 39 STANFORD L.
REV. 1103 (1987); Unconstitutional Conditions Symposium, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 175
(1989).
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rationally related to the spending program, raises no constitutional
problem. a4
To the extent that congressional choice is between direct national regula-
tion of individual conduct and indirect regulation through grants to individ-
uals conditioned upon their compliance with congressional desires, the
assumption raises no federalism concerns 35 and may well work to the benefit
of the individuals involved. Use of conditional spending leaves some degree
of "choice" to the individual, while regulation does not. Frequently, how-
ever, the congressional choice is between (1) direct national regulation of
individual conduct and grants to states conditioned upon their imposition of
the desired regulation of individual conduct; or (2) direct national regulation
of state conduct and grants to states conditioned upon the states' compliance
with congressional desires. While theoretically the benefit of choice inherent
in Congress's conditional spending approach accrues to the states as well as
to individuals, the interaction between state and federal governmental enti-
ties does raise issues of federalism in this context. If it is politically more
difficult to resist national control over in-state individual activity or the ac-
tivity of states themselves when that control is exercised under the guise of
conditional grants than it is to resist direct imposition of the same control,
then the ability of the states to operate in the only arena left to them is
diminished by congressional reliance on the spending power.36 The funda-
mental issue is not one of clarity per se as to be effective, statutory conditions
must be clearly stated.37 Rather, the concern with clarity merely reflects the
need for the states to be able to protect themselves effectively from national
34. For example, if Congress could, pursuant to the Commerce Clause, impose a nation-
wide speed limit, it might instead choose to withhold federal grants from those states that fail
to impose and enforce the desired speed limit themselves, even if, as a practical matter, the
states have been "coerced" to adhere to the condition. "Certainly, Congress may use its
Spending Power to encourage states to participate in cooperative and voluntary ventures
within the parameters of the Commerce Clause. 'The reach of the Spending Power, within its
sphere, is at least as broad as the regulatory powers of Congress.'" Nevada v. Skinner, 884
F.2d 445, 449 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 475 (1980)), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 1070 (1990).
35. Since the federal government does not impose taxes on the states, congressional use of
a "penalty" tax when the taxed activity could be prohibited directly also raises no concerns
relevant to the thesis of this Article.
36. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987) (discussing the power of
Congress to "attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds, and [to] ... employ [ ] the
power to 'further broad policy objectives by conditioning receipt of federal moneys upon com-
pliance by the recipient with federal statutory and administrative directives' " (quoting Fulli-
love, 448 U.S. at 474)).
37. See Pennhurst State School v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 18 (1981) (holding that Con-
gress did not intend 42 U.S.C. § 6010(1)-(2) (1976) "to require the States to assume the high
cost of providing 'appropriate treatment' in the 'least restrictive environment' to their mentally
retarded citizens").
[Vol. 42:511
Political Federalism
control. Anything that decreases that ability cuts against the Supreme
Court's assumption that federalism need only be politically guaranteed. 31
Professor Albert Rosenthal identifies one potential difficulty facing states
when they object to conditions imposed on federal spending that does not
exist when Congress is contemplating direct regulation: the need for states to
lobby simultaneously for federal funding but against the imposition of feder-
ally-mandated conditions. 39 The states' position on both fronts is weakened,
resulting in acceptance of an otherwise highly objectionable condition in or-
der to preserve access to ever more necessary and increasingly unavailable
federal money.' This difficulty ordinarily arises in the first-identified con-
text of congressional choice between direct and indirect regulation of indi-
vidual conduct, discussed above.41 An obvious example of this is Congress's
decision to condition state access to highway funding on the states' imposi-
tion of a congressionally-chosen speed limit or drinking age.42 However, the
dilemma also arises when Congress chooses to condition the grant of federal
funds on compliance by the states themselves.4 3 Although insufficient em-
pirical data exist to support the reality of the difficulty of simultaneously
seeking federal money while objecting to a federal condition," intuitively it
seems inevitable. Moreover, it is unlikely that Congress would indepen-
dently consider state objections. While national legislation in the past may
have been interstitial, operating against the background of the laws of the
states, today it is increasingly pervasive as Congress characterizes more and
more problems as "nation-wide" or "beyond the ability of any one state to
control." Furthermore, if the condition is publicly unpopular, Congress
may gain some political advantage by having it imposed by the state rather
than the national government. Even if the general population is aware of the
actual source of the law, national legislators can shift the focus to the states
by claiming that the state was free to refuse the money. Although many
38. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
39. Albert J. Rosenthal, Conditional Federal Spending as a Regulatory Device, 26 SAN
DIEGo L. REv. 277, 280-81 (1989) (stating that further research must be conducted to deter-
mine the effectiveness of states' political power "when the issue is conditional spending rather
than direct regulation").
40. Rosenthal, supra note 33, at 1141-42; Rosenthal, supra note 39, at 281 (noting that
cutbacks in federal funding of state programs may "squeeze" states into difficult decision mak-
ing situations); cf South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) ("Our decisions have recog-
nized that in some circumstances the financial inducement offered by Congress might be so
coercive as to pass the point at which 'pressure turns into compulsion.' " (quoting Steward
Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937))).
41. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
42. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 203; People v. Williams, 222 Cal. Rptr. 527 (1985).
43. See Oklahoma v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947) (permitting Congress to
condition access to federal highway funds upon the state's agreement that employees in jobs
funded by federal monies not take an active part in political activities).
44. See Rosenthal, supra note 33, at 1142.
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voters may realize the speciousness of this argument, it does serve to muddy
the waters and dilute the blame.45
Of course, if the condition is politically unpopular in certain regions,
states in those regions may use that unpopularity to their own advantage by
casting themselves as unwillingly coerced partners in a national scheme, par-
ticularly if the condition is one which the state governments themselves
would like to impose.46 This desire to hide behind "Big Brother" may also
reduce the willingness of states to combat national encroachment. However,
to the extent that a fundamental value of federalism is its resulting protec-
tion of regionally diverse responses to similar problems based on the per-
ceived closer ties between state representatives and the electorate, such
short-term state interests should be discounted.
If the use of the spending power in lieu of direct regulation makes it more
difficult for the political process to defend the role of the states, the question
of what limitations on its use, if any, should be imposed remains un-
resolved.47 Today, cooperative programs seem entrenched in the legislative
45. Cf Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic The-
ory of Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism, 76 VA. L. REV. 265
(1990). Macey argues that Congress's refusal to regulate allows it to garner political gain and
is likely to occur, inter alia, when controversial measures are opposed by special interest
groups. Id. at 284-90. Obviously, the gains achieved by conditional spending would be less
than those achieved by total noninterference, but gains there nonetheless would be. The polit-
ical history behind the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 96-573, 94 Stat.
3347 (1980), effectively demonstrates this reality. See New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct.
2408, 2435-38 (1992) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
46. For a slightly different twist, see Federalism and Administrative Structure, 92 YALE
L.J. 1342 (1983) (summarizing a paper presented by Professor Robert M. Cover). The sum-
mary of Professor Cover's argument states that cooperative programs, in which the federal
government funds programs run by the states under federal guidelines, "co-opt ... potential
opposition [by local elites]. They actually increase the patronage exercised by local elites and
retain local elite domination over beneficiary groups. As a result, state and local political
figures and party organizations are 'bought off,' co-opted from pursuing opposition to national
governmental programs." Id. at 1343. But see Susan Rose-Ackerman, Cooperative Federalism
and Co-optation, 92 YALE L.J. 1344, 1345 (1983) (disputing Professor Cover's conclusion that
such cooperative ventures should be replaced by totally federal programs to ensure that
"[s]tate and nation ... be politically combative").
47. Of course, Congress could theoretically recognize the problem and refuse to couch the
equivalent of direct regulation in terms of conditional grants. On the one hand, such a choice
might appear logical, since federal attempts to use the spending power in this fashion histori-
cally arose when preferred direct regulation was barred by the Supreme Court's narrow inter-
pretation of the Commerce Clause and broad interpretation of the Tenth Amendment. On the
other hand, the very reasons that use of the spending power creates concern provide a strong
federal political advantage to its choice. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. If the
Court remains willing to entrust federalism to the political process, at the least the Court
should also be willing to do its part to ensure that the process permits the protection.
Admittedly, the Court has already articulated four separate limitations on Congress's spend-
ing power: (1) the expenditure must be intended to promote "the general welfare" within the
meaning of the Constitution, Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640-41 (1937); (2) the condi-
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process, and arguing for their prohibition would be unrealistic.4" However,
three relatively modest proposals, only one of which has been accepted by
the Supreme Court, would ameliorate to some degree the identified difficul-
ties that states must overcome49 and might increase corresponding congres-
sional awareness.
A. Improving the Court's Methodology: Putting Teeth in the "Reasonably
Related" Requirement
In South Dakota v. Dole,5" the Supreme Court considered a challenge to
Congress's conditioning states' receipt of federal highway funds upon their
enactment of legislation imposing a twenty-one-year-old minimum drinking
age.5 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist determined that
Congress's "relatively mild encouragement" of state action was not coercive
and was therefore a valid exercise of its spending power.52 While the cen-
tral issue addressed by the majority involved the role of the Twenty-First
Amendment,5" Justice O'Connor's dissent identified an additional issue:
whether the condition imposed was reasonably related to the purpose of the
spending.54 As Justice O'Connor noted, the majority's application of this
admittedly constitutional requirement was "cursory and unconvincing,"55
involving a brief reference to highway safety and the problem of teenagers
commuting to states with a lower age limit.56 Certainly, in the context of
direct regulation under the Commerce Clause, the requirement that federal
regulation of intrastate activity be "reasonably related" to interstate com-
tions imposed by Congress must be clear and unambiguous, Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981); (3) the conditions must be reasonably related to the expen-
diture's purpose, Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978); Ivenhoe Irrigation
Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 295 (1958); and (4) the overall conditional spending must
not violate another independent constitutional provision, Lawrence County v. Lead-Dead-
wood Sch. Dist., 469 U.S. 256, 269-70 (1985); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 9 (1976). How-
ever, despite these theoretical limitations, the Court's practical application of such restrictions
is diluted by traditional judicial deference to Congress. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483
U.S. 203, 208 n.3 (1987) ("Our cases have not required that we define the outer bounds of the
'germaneness' or 'relatedness' limitation on the imposition of conditions under the spending
power."); Helvering, 301 U.S. at 645 ("[T]he concept of [the general] welfare or the opposite is
shaped by Congress.").
48. See supra note 40 (discussing the inability of states to challenge conditions placed on
federal spending).
49. See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
50. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
51. Id. at 205.
52. Id. at 211-12.
53. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, construed in Dole, 483 U.S. at 205-06, 208-12.
54. Dole, 483 U.S. at 213 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 213.
56. Id. at 213-14 (criticizing the majority's finding of a "reasonable relationship" between
the condition and Congress's stated purpose).
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merce is an extraordinarily low hurdle that the Supreme Court invariably
permits Congress to jump with no difficulty." However, the hurdle need not
be identical when the power exercised is indirect, nor should it be. The dif-
ference between spending to promote the general welfare5" and regulating to
achieve the same goal is critical to the concept of limited federal authority.
If unchecked reliance on the spending power enables Congress to do indi-
rectly what it politically could not do directly under the commerce power,
federalism has lost its political as well as judicial defense.
The first proposal to limit Congress's use of conditional spending is to
distinguish between permissible conditions that specify how federal funds
should be spent and impermissible conditions that extend beyond the scope
of such specification. In an amicus brief for the Dole case, the National
Conference of State Legislatures59 made such a proposal,6" adopted by Jus-
tice O'Connor in her dissent.6 The restriction imposed on Congress by this
distinction is slight but significant. It permits federal adoption of a host of
cooperative programs, while at the same time preventing unrelated bribery.
Additionally, the distinction does not preclude the traditional judicial defer-
ence to congressional findings of reasonableness.62 Rather, the restriction
57. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
58. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 8, cl. 1.
59. The concern expressed in the brief of the National Conference of State Legislatures in
the Dole case underscores the argument that states find it more difficult to combat spending
"conditions" than direct regulation. Brief for the Nat'l Conference of State Legislatures, at 12-
24 Dole (No. 86-260); see supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
60. See Brief for the Nat'l Conference of State Legislatures, Dole (No. 86-260). As the
brief explained:
Congress has the power to spend for the general welfare, it has the power to legislate
only for delegated purposes....
The appropriate inquiry, then, is whether the spending requirement or prohibition
is a condition on a grant or whether it is regulation. The difference turns on whether
the requirement specifies in some way how the money should be spent, so that Con-
gress's intent in making the grant will be effectuated. Congress has no power under
the Spending Clause to impose requirements on a grant that go beyond specifying
how the money should be spent. A requirement that is not such a specification is not
a condition, but a regulation, which is valid only if it falls within one of Congress's
delegated regulatory powers.
Id. at 19-20; see also infra note 64 and accompanying text (rejecting the assumption of validity
if the condition falls within a direct regulatory power).
61. Justice O'Connor further justified this proposed limit by quoting the Court's opinion
in United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936), which struck down the Agricultural Adjustment
Act because it extended beyond the scope of Congress's spending power. Id. at 78. Justice
O'Connor cited the Butler Court's statement that "'[t]here is an obvious difference between a
statute stating the conditions upon which moneys shall be expended and one effective only
upon assumption of a contractual obligation to submit to a regulation which otherwise could
not be enforced.'" South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 215-16 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissent-
ing) (quoting Butler, 297 U.S. at 73).
62. See McColloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819).
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only identifies the factors that must be reasonably related. Perhaps less judi-
cial deference to such findings of reasonableness would be appropriate,
particularly in light of the high degree of deference logically given to a con-
gressional decision that the purpose of the spending will indeed promote the
general welfare.63 However, the Supreme Court should at least be willing to
prevent Congress from trying to achieve regulatory goals such as highway
safety by imposing conditions on the receipt of funds unrelated to their
expenditure.
B. Improving the Court's Methodology, Part II: Acknowledging the
Difference Between Spending and Regulatory Powers
A second proposal to limit Congress's use of conditional spending is that
the Supreme Court should abandon its assumption that if a condition could
constitutionally be imposed as a direct regulation it is an appropriate condi-
tion whether or not it is related to how the funds are spent. Since today
most direct regulation falls within the scope of the Commerce Clause, it fol-
lows that under this assumption most conditions would automatically fall
within that same scope and be deemed constitutional. Without abandon-
ment of this assumption, it is difficult to envision many situations, other than
that involved in Dole, in which Justice O'Connor's suggested restriction64
would be of any value. Yet the political realities which make it less likely
that conditions will be resisted as effectively as regulations demand that the
restriction be a real one.
C. Upping Congress's Burden to Articulate its Conditions: Valuing
Informed State Choice Over Congressional Convenience
In order to be enforceable, conditions placed upon the receipt of federal
funds must be clearly stated as conditions, rather than as goals or aspira-
tions.65 Such a requirement is uncontroversial and logically is imperative, as
no potential recipient of funds could make a reasoned choice to participate
in a federally funded program without knowing the price of participation.6 6
63. It is difficult to see how an appointed judiciary could rationally disagree with elected
representatives about the content of anything as amorphous as the "general welfare." See
Dole, 483 U.S. at 208 (1987) (citing Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 645 (1937)).
64. Dole, 483 U.S. at 216-17 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also supra note 61.
65. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).
66. Cf Air Transp. Ass'n of Am. v. Department of Transp., 900 F.2d 369, 375 (D.C. Cir.
1990) (" '[I]nformed administrative decisionmaking require(s] that agency decisions be made
only after affording interested persons' an opportunity to communicate their views to the
agency." (quoting Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 316 (1979), vacated, 498 U.S. 1077
(1991)); id ("[B]y mandating 'openness, explanation, and participatory democracy' in the
rulemaking process, these [notice and comment] procedures assure the legitimacy of adminis-
trative norms." (quoting Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1978))).
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Through its rules of statutory interpretation, the Supreme Court should con-
tinue to force Congress to speak unequivocally when imposing conditions
governing the expenditure of federal funds. However, the Court's approach
to interpreting the requirements of a given condition and their applicability
to a specific fact pattern has weakened this mandate and diluted Congress's
responsibility to articulate the conditions imposed on federal spending. In
broad terms, the debate over the Supreme Court's methodology is between
the attempt to loosely define an actual or constructive congressional purpose
and the narrow, literal focus on the specific wording of a questioned pas-
sage.6 7 Ordinarily, if congressional purpose is clear but a literal interpreta-
tion of the text points to a contrary result, blind obedience to the statutory
text may fairly be criticized as wasteful of congressional and judicial re-
sources.6" Forcing Congress to spell out its conditions in precise detail,
however, necessarily requires a definition of the extent to which access to
federal monies deprives the recipient of otherwise existing choices. This in-
creases the likelihood of a politically potent objection by a state to the depri-
vation of such choices and the chance that a potential state recipient will
refuse to participate.
The Supreme Court's decision in Grove City College v. Bell 69 clearly dem-
onstrates this dilemma. The Grove City decision involved whether Title IX
of the Education Amendments of 197270 applies to colleges whose students
accept federal financial assistance and, if such colleges are subject to Title
IX, whether the statute precludes discrimination on the basis of sex within
the institution as a whole or only within the program or programs of the
institution that "receive" the federal funds.7 ' Focusing on the statute's legis-
lative history and purpose, a unanimous Court agreed that the college was a
federal fund "recipient" within the meaning of Title IX, even though it re-
ceived those funds indirectly through student financial aid.72 The Court
split, however, on the question of the scope of the application of Title IX's
nondiscrimination requirement. 73 Doing little more than quoting what it
67. See West Virginia Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Casey, 11 S. Ct. 1138, 1153-55 (1991) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting), superseded by statute as stated in Stender v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 780 F.
Supp. 1302 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
68. Id.
69. 465 U.S. 555 (1984), superseded by statute as stated in Radcliff v. Landan, 883 F.2d
1481 (9th Cir. 1989).
70. Pub. L. No. 92-318, §§ 901-07, 86 Stat. 373 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1681
(1988)).
71. Although Justice Stevens concurred, he argued that the second issue was not in dis-
pute. See Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 579-80 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justices
Brennan and Marshall, in dissent, noted Justice Stevens's argument approvingly, see id. at 583
n. I (Brennan, J., dissenting), but did address the merits of the issue.
72. Id. at 569-70 (majority opinion).
73. See id. at 577-78 (Powell, J., concurring).
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believed to be dispositive statutory language,74 the majority held that the
statute precluded sexual discrimination only in the college's isolated finan-
cial aid program."' In a vigorous dissent, Justices Brennan and Marshall
relied on congressional intent, as revealed in Title IX's legislative history, to
argue that, once an educational institution is found to receive federal funds,
the entire institution is subject to the antidiscrimination provisions of Title
IX.7 ' The dissenters obviously better understood congressional purpose, as
the second holding in the case was repudiated by Congress in the Civil
Rights Restoration Act of 1987. 77
It is apparently easy enough to justify the Grove City dissent. In the first
place, the majority relied on congressional purpose and legislative history to
determine that indirect as well as direct benefit to the college triggered Title
IX; 7 why not utilize the same indicators of congressional intent in deter-
mining the scope of the condition? In the second place, Congress itself
confirmed the dissent in unmistakable terms. 79 And finally, how could any
rational body support discrimination in any educational program? Of
course, what is apparent need not be real.
In the context of judicial choice between employing a broad interpretation
of congressional purpose and a narrow textual interpretation, it may be ar-
gued that the Grove City majority erred not in refusing to look to a broad
legislative purpose with respect to the second issue-the scope of Title IX's
nondiscrimination requirement-but in looking to such a purpose with
respect to the first issue, whether or not the college was a federal fund recipi-
ent. Although the antidiscrimination purpose of Title IX was clear, the con-
ditions Congress imposed to achieve this purpose were not. No literal
language in the statute addressed the distinction between direct and indirect
aid.s" In light of the traditionally local nature of educational institutions
and the need to assure states the political wherewithal to resist federal en-
croachment, perhaps the Court should, as a matter of course, prefer the nar-
rowest interpretive choice and hold that federal financial assistance does not
include indirect aid. However, to preclude any indirect aid from triggering
74. Id. at 574 (majority opinion) ("The regulations apply, by their terms, 'to every re-
cipient and to each education program or activity operated by such recipient which receives or
benefits from Federal financial assistance.'" (quoting 34 C.F.R. § 106.11 (1983) (emphasis
added by Grove City Court))).
75. Id. at 574-75.
76. Id. at 583-86. The dissenting opinion also relied on post-enactment history. See id. at
592-98 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
77. Pub. L. No. 100-259, § 2, 102 Stat. 28 (1988) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (1988)).
78. Grove City, 465 U.S. at 564. "It is not surprising to find, therefore, that the language
of § 901(a) contains no hint that Congress perceived a substantive difference between direct
institutional assistance and aid received by a school through its students." Id.
79. § 2, 102 Stat. at 28.
80. Cf id.
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the antidiscrimination provision of Title IX would, as the majority noted,"'
have frustrated congressional purpose by exempting not only institutions
whose students alone received aid, but also institutions with students who
received aid that was funneled through state agencies, a proposition the
plaintiff did not advance and one that would have seriously undercut the
statute's coverage.
However, similar undercutting of the statute's coverage occurred when
the majority ignored congressional intent and used a literal textual interpre-
tation to support its refusal to extend the antidiscrimination requirement to
the institution as a whole.8 2 The difference in the majority's approach is
justifiable given the different statutory provisions involved: the statutory
language "receiving aid" might as easily encompass indirect aid as not, but
"each education program or activity ... which receives or benefits from" fed-
eral aid 3 surely must be stretched if not ignored to encompass, on any set of
facts, all programs and activities of a benefitting institution. While subse-
quent congressional action made clear the legislative intent,84 the demands
of political federalism fairly require that such intent be clearly stated. Those
demands answer as well the third argument raised in support of the dissent:
the issue in this context is not whether Congress could rationally be thought
to permit sexual discrimination, but whether Congress could rationally be
thought to condition the expenditure of federal funds solely on the activities
of that part of an institution benefitting from those funds. Surely it could.
Politically perhaps it should.85 In any event, when the "plain meaning" of
81. Id. at 568 n. 19.
82. Id. at 574.
83. Id. (quoting 34 C.F.R. § 106.4 (1983) (emphasis added by Grove City Court)).
84. § 2, 102 Stat. at 28.
85. If the first limitation on Congress's authority to place conditions on those who accept
federal funds is treated seriously, it may be questionable for Congress to insist that an entire
institution abide by federal antidiscrimination policy if any of the money received by that
institution comes from the federal treasury. Congress certainly can insist that programs which
it funds, even indirectly, cannot discriminate on the-basis of sex, but to insist that the grant
recipient refrain from such discrimination in all aspects of its endeavor does not initially ap-
pear reasonably related to the issue placed within the congressional ambit by the spending
power, i.e., how federal money is spent. While the goal of nondiscriminatory education is a
laudable one-as is that of highway safety, recognized by the Supreme Court in South Dakota
v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987)--the problem is that the goal is not rationally tied to federal
spending. Of course, Congress presumably could regulate against such discrimination directly
because of its effect on interstate commerce. However, while this would currently satisfy even
Justice O'Connor, see id. at 218, the second reform proposal-abolishing the assumption that
indirect regulation through conditional spending is constitutional if the goal of the regulation
could be achieved through the constitutional means of direct regulation-would preclude ref-
erence to regulatory power to sustain spending conditions.
Nonetheless, even in light of those two proposed limitations, Title IX regulation should be
able to pass at least the minimal scrutiny currently required by the Court's "rationally or
reasonably related" criteria. Money obtained from the federal government to fund a science
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statutory language chosen by Congress supports such an interpretation, the
Court should look to that language as a prime indicator of congressional
purpose. An interpretation based on statutory language should be chosen by
the Court rather than one supported only by the "broad remedial purpose"
of the statute.
None of the preceding arguments for reform in any way restricts Con-
gress's final power to supplant state regulation when a federal solution to a
perceived national problem is sought. However, the combined reform pro-
posals do assure those who are opposed to such solutions a reasonable op-
portunity to present their opposition based on notions of federalism. If the
Supreme Court adopts such reforms, Congress will in some instances be un-
able and in others be discouraged from using its spending power to regulate
indirectly and will employ other, more direct powers as the principal means
of national regulation. Ultimately, this forced congressional reliance on di-
rect regulation will help to clarify federal ascendancy previously masked by
federal "generosity."
III. THE POWER TO CREATE INFERIOR FEDERAL COURTS
Not all congressional powers are regulatory, and those that are not should
be interpreted in light of their limited thrust. Similarly, federal regulatory
powers are not all designed to permit identical kinds of regulation.8 6 How-
ever, with a single exception,8 7 the list of powers following the authority to
tax and spend all share one common characteristic: all permit Congress to
regulate the conduct of various groups of people vis-a-vis other groups with
respect to certain matters involved in day-to-day living."8 In other words,
almost all federal regulatory powers permit some degree of federal control
over the "substantive" law, the law that defines the rights, duties and obliga-
tions members of society owe to one another. It is axiomatic that the combi-
program, for example, inevitably frees up other institutional money to subsidize a sports pro-
gram. While it is possible that a certain institution could convincingly argue that the federal
money provides the sole basis for the existence of the funded program and, therefore, its fund-
ing has no impact on any other part of the institution's budget, money is frequently fungible,
and Congress could rely on the "class" rationale to justify its condition even in that hypotheti-
cal case. See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 152-54 (1971) (noting that "[w]here the
class of activities is regulated and that class is within reach of federal power, the courts have no
power 'to excise, as trivial, individual instances' of the class") (quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392
U.S. 183, 193 (1968), overruled by National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)
(emphasis added by Perez Court)).
86. Each enumerated power is designed to allow the federal government to control a cer-
tain activity; the activity arising from the authority to provide and maintain a navy, U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 13, differs from the activity related to the authority to promote the
progress of science by securing copyright protection. Id., cl. 8.
87. Id., cl. 9.
88. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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nation of these federal powers is less than the total control of all such rights,
duties and obligations. The country assumes that some conduct capable of
governmental regulation may only be regulated by the states, 9 and the Con-
stitution itself protects certain other conduct from any governmental regula-
tion. The single exception to these substantive powers is the authority of
Congress to establish tribunals inferior to the United States Supreme Court
and, as an action necessary and proper to the carrying out of that authority,
to govern the procedures to be used in resolving disputes by the courts it
creates. 90
Modern Supreme Court opinions relevant to this specific congressional
power began with Erie Railroad v. Tompkins.91 At the constitutional heart
of the opinion was the notion that adjudicatory authority is separate from
regulatory authority and the holding that the latter need not flow from the
former.92 The Court reasoned that, simply because the Constitution permits
certain cases to be heard in federal courts not based on subject matter but on
the parties involved, the existence of federal jurisdiction does not resolve the
question of the existence of federal regulatory authority.93 Congress, there-
fore, may not point to its authority to establish inferior federal courts to
justify the regulation of parties' conduct outside the courtroom. Congress
instead must point to some other Article I power to justify providing "sub-
stantive" as opposed to "procedural" law.94
The debate over what is encompassed within congressional control of pro-
cedure has occupied the Supreme Court and commentators for half a cen-
tury. Current wisdom states that Congress itself may regulate anything that
is "arguably procedural," a standard drawn from Hanna v. Plumer95 and
89. While the current understanding of the scope of the Commerce Clause may, as a
practical matter, make that assumption judicially unenforceable, it is nonetheless a political
reality that lies at the heart of the arguments put forward in this Article. See supra notes 9-10,
and accompanying text. It may theoretically be possible for Congress to adopt the Uniform
Commercial Code or enact a national inheritance law, but it is not likely. Furthermore, while
the Supreme Court's sweeping Commerce Clause language makes it difficult to foresee a judi-
cial negation of any congressional statute, the Court has never indicated that federalism im-
poses no limit on congressional action; rather, it has only stated that Congress itself must be
the judge of those constitutional limitations.
90. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1988) (vesting in the Supreme Court the power to "prescribe
general rules of practice and procedure").
91. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
92. Id. at 79-80.
93. In light of current Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the instances of constitutional
incongruity are at best few and far between, although for purposes of this Article that is irrele-
vant. Nonetheless, from the theoretician's point of view it is frustrating; as my colleague
Professor Linda Hirschman once wrote in an unpublished manuscript: "Now that I finally
understand Erie, it doesn't matter anymore."
94. Id. at 79-80.
95. 380 U.S. 460, 476 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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ably defended by Professor John Hart Ely. 96 Professor Ely argues that as
long as a congressional enactment can rationally be said to be "one designed
to make the process of litigation a fair and efficient mechanism for the reso-
lution of disputes," it satisfies the constitutional limitations on this power
without regard to the state law it displaces.97 Professor Ely points to the fact
that, at least since 1937, no congressional enactment has been struck down
based on the nature of the state law it displaced, and argues that, therefore,
federal procedural laws may displace state substantive laws.9" Professor Ely
made clear that this argument addresses congressional power, not the power
of the Supreme Court to promulgate Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the
power of the federal courts to create procedural common law.99 Both of
those latter powers are more narrowly confined by congressional statutes
than is Congress's Article I power.I°°
The difficulty with the "arguably procedural, ergo constitutional" '' argu-
ment is a function of the very fact on which it rests: depending upon how a
balance between competing policies is struck, a law may fairly be character-
ized as either procedural or substantive.'0 2 Professor Ely's example is in-
structive: in determining whether to grant a spouse testimonial immunity,
the decision maker must balance the need for all relevant evidence to achieve
a fair verdict against the desire to promote confidentiality, trust and har-
mony in marital relationships. 10 3 If the decision maker determines that the
procedural interest in verdicts based on complete knowledge outweighs the
substantive interest in promoting a certain kind of socially sanctioned rela-
tionship, the resulting law admitting spousal testimony would be "arguably
procedural."'" However, if the reverse balance is struck, the law precluding
the testimony would be "substantive" because it would be designed not to
foster litigation-related goals but rather to promote the desired conduct
outside the courtroom."°" If the decision maker has authority to consider
96. John H. Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 718-38 (1974).
97. Id. at 724 (footnotes omitted).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 698.
100. The Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1988), and The Rules of Decision Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1652 (1988), respectively.
101. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 476 (Harlan, J., concurring).
102. Cf Air Transp. Ass'n of Am. v. Department of Transp., 900 F.2d 369, 381 (D.C. Cir.
1990) (Silberman, J., dissenting) ("Lines between substance and procedure in various areas of
the law are difficult to draw and therefore often perplex scholars and judges."), vacated, 498
U.S. 1077.
103. Ely, supra note 96, at 739-40.
104. Id. at 738-40.
105. Id. at 723. Another example might involve the award of attorneys' fees for bad faith
litigation practices. See NASCO, Inc. v. Calcasieu Television & Radio, Inc., 894 F.2d 696,
705-06 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that the inherent power of the federal district court allowed
fee-shifting in a diversity suit even though the forum state, in the absence of an authorizing
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both procedural and substantive policies, the distinction between the two
may not matter unless some other value imposes a constraint. However, the
fact that Congress has clear authority to consider procedural policies does
not mean that Congress also has clear authority to consider and weigh com-
peting substantive policies. Therefore, unless the Commerce Clause is some-
how implicated in marital confidentiality, it is difficult to understand how
Congress may legitimately consider the appropriate weight to be given to
concerns the Constitution specifically leaves to the states.
Perhaps the answer is that while Congress in the abstract would lack au-
thority to consider what, as a matter of policy, should be fostered in a mar-
riage, it may, in light of the Necessary and Proper Clause, consider and
reject those concerns in the context of crafting procedural rules. The anal-
ogy would therefore be to Congress's inability to regulate intrastate com-
merce in the abstract and its ability to do so in the context of regulating or
protecting interstate commerce. However, the analogy is troublesome be-
cause of the distinction between substance and procedure and the different
methods by which state substantive law is replaced. In the commerce con-
text, the effect that substantive intrastate activity has on substantive federal
goals justifies the direct regulation of intrastate activity.10 6 By contrast, in
the evidentiary privilege context the effect the substantive state policy has on
federal procedural goals is thought to justify the indirect negation of state
policy. Ordinarily, procedure is assumed to be a tool for the achievement of
substantive law and policy rather than an independently valuable system di-
vorced from those laws and policies. Certainly if a procedural goal con-
flicted with a substantive goal adopted by the same governmental entity, the
procedural goal would be abandoned unless the entity had made a conscious
choice to change its substantive policy. Thus, it is a problematic assumption
that merely because the federal system may regulate its own judicial proce-
dures, it may also displace substantive choices made by a state that the fed-
eral system lacks the authority to make itself. True, the federal law speaks
to courtroom activity, but technically so too would federal laws concerning
whether evidence was sufficient to allow a claim to be submitted to a jury if
there was no support for an element necessary to recovery or whether a
defense should be stricken as legally insufficient. Although Congress may
clearly weigh competing procedural policies as it sees fit under its power to
statute or contract provision, did not allow fee-shifting), aff'd sub nom. Chambers v. NASCO,
Ill S. Ct. 2123 (1991). The NASCO court noted that bad faith in the prosecution of a claim is
not inevitably regarded as procedural. A decision regarding how "substantial" a claim must
be in order to avoid sanction by the court as frivolous may implicate state policies favoring
private attorneys general. Id. at 705.
106. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942) (upholding federal regula-
tion of agricultural products grown solely for in-state consumption).
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create inferior federal courts, the limitation Congress has imposed on the
Supreme Court's rulemaking power-that procedural and evidentiary rules
must not displace substantive law'° 7-should be imposed on Congress as
well if Congress lacks the authority to create the substantive law it displaces.
Otherwise, the general police power which the constitutional structure
sought to keep out of federal hands may creep in through a door thought to
be locked by Erie.
An obvious reply to this argument is that because the Commerce Clause
door is already wide open, such limitation on congressional authority makes
little practical or even theoretical difference. If the only limitation is that
Congress must have authority pursuant to other provisions of Article I, Sec-
tion 8 of the Constitution in order to consider implicated substantive poli-
cies, such authority will almost always be present, and the spousal testimony
problem is only a law professor's bizarre hypothetical. 0 8 However, there
does exist an independent restraint on Congress's ability to consider sub-
stantive policies in the context of creating procedural rules: politically pro-
tected federalism. Although the difficulties raised by achieving substantive
regulatory goals through the use of procedural law are different from those
107. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (1988).
108. In fact, Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence obviates even the hypothetical
problem by providing that if a claim or defense is to be decided under state law, state law also
is to provide the rules of testimonial privilege. The protection thus given state substantive
policy, however, is not absolute. If a case involves both federal and state claims, testimony
admissible under federal but not state law may be admitted and considered by the jury with
respect to both claims. See Hancock v. Hobbs, 967 F.2d 462 (11 th Cir. 1992). Furthermore,
at least one district court has held, against all logic; that federal law controls the admissibility
of evidence relevant only to the state claim if that claim is pendent to a federal question. Doe
v. Special Investigations Agency, Inc., 779 F. Supp. 21 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
In a different context, however, the rules of evidence themselves raise the issue. Compare
FED. R. EvID. 408 (preventing a jury from being told of the existence and amount of any
settlement agreement between the plaintiff and a prior third-party defendant) with Tritsch v.
Boston Edison Co., 293 N.E.2d 264, 267 (Mass. 1973) (holding that a defendant could "show
in evidence the amount of money paid or promised to the plaintiff" in order to mitigate dam-
ages). In Carota v. Johns Manville Corp., 893 F.2d 448 (1st Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
Carota v. Celotex Corp., 497 U.S. 1004 (1990), a diversity case, the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit held state law to be controlling even though the court recognized
that the issue fell into a "twilight zone" rationally capable of being classified either as substan-
tive or procedural. Id. at 450. The court reasoned that since the state policy "reflects a view
of [settlement] evidence as substantive, because the juries' hearing of this evidence affects the
substantive rights of plaintiffs to damages," failure to utilize state law would "usurp[ ] from
[the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court] the power to formulate its own policies and to
give force to its own law." Id. at 451. The Carota opinion is noteworthy because it rejected
the usual unthinking judicial acceptance of what the court apparently assumed to be relevant
federal rules, and because the court furnished no real justification for its decision other than its
desire not to frustrate state substantive policy. Id. But see Humenik v. Celotex Corp., 908
F.2d 962 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 983 (1990).
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noted in the similar use of the spending power, they are, if anything, more
severe. 109
In order to be enforceable, regulatory spending conditions must be clearly
stated. The states' inability to resist their imposition successfully is polit-
ical." This is not the case, however, with substantive changes resulting
from procedural laws. A state with a strong policy against the enforcement
of forum selection clauses, for example, would hardly perceive its policy to
be threatened by a congressional statute permitting the transfer of a case
filed in one federal district court to another district court "[fQor the conven-
ience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice."' I IYet judicial
interpretation of that federal procedural law has directed a transfer in ac-
cordance with such a clause, even though it was unenforceable in the state in
which the transferring district court sat." 2 The failure to require a clear
statement from Congress also raises problems of judicial interpretation. It is
as unclear that Congress considered and intended the federal negation of
state policy as it is that the states whose policy was thus negated were aware
of the impact of the proposed legislation.' 13 Assuming that Congress does
have the authority to consider the substantive policies affected by its proce-
dural choices, such consideration needs to be undertaken openly. Either the
Supreme Court should insist that the displacement of state substantive poli-
cies by a procedural rule must be clearly stated,1 4 or it should preclude such
109. See id.
110. See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text (discussing the political challenge states
fare in opposing spending conditions).
111. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988).
112. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22 (1988) (holding that although Alabama
law disfavored contractual choice-of-forum provisions, the parties' forum-selection clause
should receive consideration and that 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) controlled the issue).
113. Similar interpretive difficulties arise in nearly every preemption case. Yet when the
congressional act is clearly regulatory, while neither Congress nor the states may have a com-
plete understanding of its impact on state law (Congress because it may well be unaware of
precisely what state law there is, and the states because they cannot accurately predict judicial
decisions), both Congress and the states are aware of the potential problem. A state with a
strong aversion to arbitration would have had the opportunity to lobby against a federal law
making agreements to arbitrate enforceable in any contract affecting interstate commerce, a
red flag not available under the facts of Stewart.
114. Current Supreme Court doctrine contains the theoretical seed of such a requirement,
although its potential for growth suffered a severe set-back in Stewart, 487 U.S. at 22. Ever
since Ragan v. Merchants' Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949), the Court has
insisted that a threshold inquiry must be made as to whether an argued-for federal rule was
intended to govern the issue raised. For example, if a rule defining when a claim is commenced
is not designed to define when the applicable statute of limitations is tolled, then the conflict is
between federal and state common law. See generally Converse v. General Motors Corp., 893
F.2d 513 (2d Cir. 1990) (choosing state law over competing federal common law to grant
summary judgment to a defendant served after the statute of limitations had run); Sentry
Corp. v. Harris, 802 F.2d 229 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1004 (1987); Walko Corp.
v. Burger Chef Sys., Inc., 554 F.2d 1165 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Mitchell A. Lowenthal et al., Spe-
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indirect displacement altogether and demand that substantive issues be regu-
lated only by reference to some other enumerated power.115
Three issues currently confronting lower courts clearly illustrate the prob-
lem: forum selection clauses, the preclusive effect of judgments, and the in-
terpretation of settlement agreements. Each will be considered, the first
quite thoroughly and the others more briefly, in an attempt to clarify what
cial Project, Time Bars in Specialized Federal Common Law: Federal Rights of Action and
State Statutes of Limitations, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 1011 (1980) (asserting that federal courts
should apply state statutes of limitation by presumption since it is unlikely that Congress will
enact uniform laws). The Converse decision is correct if the state tolling rule would place a
materially different burden on the plaintiff than its federal counterpart, thus leading to forum
shopping and discrimination against those without the opportunity to seek another forum. See
also Sims Snowboards, Inc. v. Kelly, 863 F.2d 643 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that Rule 65 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure only defines terms upon which preliminary injunctions may
be issued, if such relief is available at all; state law disallowing such injunctions when a con-
tract is for personal services must be used in a diversity case because, while not technically
governing the final outcome of the case, to issue the injunction would give the plaintiff what
the state would deny him). But cf Hughes v. Mayo Clinic, 834 F.2d 713 (8th Cir. 1987)
(ruling that Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides the filing date from which
after-occurring events are counted), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1210 (1988). Requiring that a clear
congressional statement of applicability must be found before holding that a federal rule is
applicable in an ambiguous context would help to achieve the clear intention to displace sub-
stantive state policies. However, standing alone it would be insufficient, since failure to iden-
tify clearly that which is displaced constitutes a failure as well to recognize the (substantive)
nature of that which is displaced.
115. Failure to do either frustrates a state's efforts to defend its autonomy and contributes
to a lack of judicial and congressional consideration and recognition of federal limitations. An
example of this can be found in the context Rule 407 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which
addresses the admissibility of evidence of subsequent remedial measures. FED. R. EVID. 407
(preventing the use of evidence of subsequent remedial measures to prove negligence). The
Advisory Committee notes justify the rule-statutorily adopted without change--on the basis
of precluding admission of technically irrelevant evidence, but the Advisory Committee con-
cedes that the "more impressive" rationale for exclusion is a "social policy of encouraging
people to take, or at least not discouraging them from taking, steps in furtherance of added
safety." FED. R. EvID. 407 advisory committee's note. While the Commerce Clause clearly
justifies federal regulation of business safety, see for example, Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (1970) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 651-678 (1988)), no reference is made by the Advisory Committee to regulatory power, and
the notion that all "social policy" is within the realm of federal control is antithetical to the
concept of a central government with limited power. Perhaps even more disturbing is the
interpretation of Rule 407 by the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, which
stated that: "[Rule 407 was] designed to promote state policy in a substantive law area." Moe
v. Avions Marcel Dassault-Breguet Aviation, 727 F.2d 917, 932 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 853 (1984). If the rulemakers recognized the issue of safety as one of state concern, it is
disconcerting to think that the rulemakers would attempt substantive federal encouragement.
In Moe, the Tenth Circuit found Rule 407 inapplicable when the federal rule was contradic-
tory to the state law, presumably in acknowledgement of the state's primary authority in the
definition of state policy. Id. That result, however, does not reflect a majority of the circuits.
See, e.g., Kelly v. Crown Equip. Co., 970 F.2d 1273, 1278 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that Rule
407 applied in a diversity case because it is "'arguably procedural' ") (quoting Hanna v.
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 476 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
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policies are appropriately considered in what context, and to suggest a limit
on congressional power necessitated by political federalism.
A. The Use of Forum Selection Clauses
The Supreme Court's decision in Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh
Corp. 116 provides an example of precisely the approach the Supreme Court
should not take. In Stewart, the plaintiff filed a breach of contract claim
against the defendant in a federal district court in Alabama."' The defend-
ant moved to transfer the case under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)". to a federal
district court in New York in accordance with a forum selection clause ad-
mittedly unenforceable in Alabama state courts." 9 The questions posed by
the majority are clearly the correct ones: does § 1404 control the issue of the
clause's enforceability and, if so, is § 1404 (thus interpreted) within Con-
gress's power to pass?' 20 Just as clearly, however, the answers to those ques-
tions are incorrect.
The majority reasoned that the federal statute was designed to ensure a
"flexible and multifaceted analysis ... [of] motions to transfer within the
federal system,"'' 2 and that forum selection clauses are therefore one rele-
vant consideration; 22 state law refusing to enforce them does not make
them irrelevant unless the contrary federal law is unconstitutional. Unsur-
prisingly, the majority 23 held that "[t]he constitutional authority of Con-
gress to enact § 1404(a) is not subject to serious question."' 24 Relying solely
on its classification as a procedural rule in various other contexts and citing
116. 487 U.S. 22 (1988).
117. The complaint in Stewart also included an antitrust claim, but none of the opinions
relied on the distinction between 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988) and 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988). For
purposes of analysis, the case was treated as one in which state law provided the rules of
decision. Id. at 26 n.3.
118. Title 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988) provides: "For the convenience of parties and wit-
nesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other
district or division where it might have been brought."
119. Stewart, 487 U.S. at 24.
120. See id. at 26-27.
121. Id. at 31.
122. Id. at 29-31. In a concurring opinion joined by Justice O'Connor, Justice Kennedy
stated that "the authority and prerogative of the federal courts.., should be exercised so that
a valid forum-selection clause is given controlling weight in all but the most exceptional cases."
Id. at 33 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 10
(1972)). As their citation to The Bremen makes clear, validity refers to contractual validity
under federal standards, not contractual or jurisdictional validity under state law. Id.
123. The concurring opinion had no comment on congressional power per se. Nor did
Justice Scalia's dissent reach this second question. See id. at 33 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 32.
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Hanna v. Plumer's'25 "arguably procedural, ergo constitutional"' 2 6 test, the
Court disposed of the issue in a single paragraph.' 27
Justice Scalia's dissent focused solely on the first issue-the scope of
§ 1404(a).' 2 ' Initially, he noted that the statutory language requires the
Court to consider the likely future course of litigation and argued that,
"without adequate textual foundation," the majority required lower federal
courts to consider the past activities of the parties in deciding a motion to
transfer.'2 9 More importantly, however, he noted:
§ 1404(a) was enacted against the background that issues of con-
tract, including a contract's validity, are nearly always governed by
state law. It is simply contrary to the practice of our system that
such an issue should be wrenched from state control in absence of
a clear conflict with federal law or explicit statutory provision....
Section 1404(a) is simply a venue provision that nowhere mentions
contracts or agreements, much less that the validity of certain con-
tracts or agreements will be matters of federal law. It is difficult to
believe that state contract law was meant to be pre-empted by this
provision that we have said 'should be regarded as a federal judicial
housekeeping measure'.... 30
Justice Scalia further compared the general language of § 1404 to the highly
specific, preemptory language of the Federal Arbitration Act,'13  and con-
cluded that if Congress wished to displace state law regarding the enforce-
ability of certain kinds of contract clauses, Congress could do so explicitly.
The concern of Justice Scalia's dissent in Stewart was with congressional
intent.' 32 Yet § 1404's lack of specificity does more than make it difficult to
perceive that intent. It also makes it difficult, if not impossible, for states to
defend their law of contracts against federal incursions. At the very least,
125. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
126. Id. at 476 (Harlan, J., concurring).
127. Stewart, 487 U.S. at 32.
128. See id. at 33 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 34.
130. Id at 36-37 (quoting Van Dusen v. Barrrack, 376 U.S. 612, 636-37 (1964), superseded
by statute as stated in Ross v. Colorado Outward Bound Sch., Inc., 822 F.2d 1524 (10th Cir.
1987)).
131. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
132. Having found § 1404 inapplicable, Justice Scalia went on to argue that since the fail-
ure to utilize Alabama law would lead to forum shopping and discrimination against those
without a comparable opportunity to shop, the Rules of Decision Act required the district
court to follow state law.
Ordinarily, if the state law arguably preempted by federal legislation regulates a field tradi-
tionally left to the states, Congress needs to speak clearly to reflect its preemptive intent. See
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 111 S. Ct. 2395 (1991); Pacific Gas & Elec. v. State Energy Resources
Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983). Apparently blinded by Hanna, the Stewart majority managed
to totally ignore obviously necessary restraints on its own imagination. Stewart, 487 U.S. at
40.
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the Court's interpretation of congressional intent should not ascribe to Con-
gress the desire to displace state substantive law unless such desire is express.
Even assuming that the congressional command to enforce forum selec-
tion clauses is clearly expressed, there remains a concern with the source of
congressional authority to displace contrary state law. The route chosen by
Congress in passing the Federal Arbitration Act was, under current consti-
tutional doctrine, clearly proper. 33 It rests on Congress's regulatory powers
over admiralty and interstate commerce,' 34 not on congressional authority
to create procedural rules for federal courts. Therefore, the Act governs the
enforceability of arbitration clauses in state as well as federal courts, and is a
substantive federal law that preempts contrary state law pursuant to the
Supremacy Clause.' 35 As written and interpreted in Stewart, however,
§ 1404 rests on the procedural authority of Congress alone. While this
"choice" does leave the states free to apply their own policies regarding fo-
rum selection clauses in cases brought in their own courts, it raises a serious
concern about the scope of federal procedural authority, even when that au-
thority is bolstered by the Necessary and Proper Clause.
In determining whether any forum selection clause should be enforceable,
any decisionmaking body must consider at least three competing policies.
Historically such clauses were disfavored as a private attempt to "oust[ ]" a
court of jurisdiction otherwise properly taken in a time when courts strongly
resisted any attempt to curtail their jurisdiction. 136  Congress may legiti-
133. The Federal Arbitration Act governs clauses providing for arbitration "in any mari-
time transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce." 9 U.S.C. § 2
(1988).
134. Prima Paint Co. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967). The extent to
which the Act may permit arbitration contrary to competing commercial policies is a matter of
congressional intent, but the Court broadly construes agreements to arbitrate, particularly in
the international context, even when such agreements arguably run afoul of the enforcement
policies embodied in federal antitrust laws. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plym-
outh, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626-28 (1985); see also Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506(1974) (enforcing arbitration clauses arising in an international context against a claim that
such clauses violate federal securities laws).
135. See Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
See generally Linda R. Hirshman, The Second Arbitration Trilogy: The Federalization of Arbi-
tration Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1305 (1985).
As interpreted, however, the degree of interference with state choices is less than might be
expected. In Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468 (1989), the Supreme
Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act created the right to compel arbitration agreed to
by the parties; however, it did not preclude the use of state law to interpret the arbitration
clause, even when the state law interpreted such clauses to permit a stay of arbitration pendingjudicial resolution of related disputes between a party to the contract and third parties. Id. at
474-77. Justice Brennan dissented, joined by Justice Marshall, and argued that federal law
must resolve issues that are necessarily antecedent to the enforcement of a federal law. Id. at
488-91 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
136. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12 (1972).
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mately take into account such a consideration because of its authority to
control the jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts it creates within the
limits of Article III. Depending upon congressional judgment concerning
the sanctity of jurisdictional grants, the clauses could be enforceable or not
and the judgment would, in either event, be a procedural one. 137
Furthermore, such clauses may be viewed as reflecting the contracting
parties' judgment regarding a convenient location for litigation. Certainly
there is a strong, valid systemic interest in resolving disputes in a forum
where the costs to the parties, witnesses and court itself are as low as possi-
ble. This is the clear goal of § 1404138 and is obviously only procedural
when the competing fora are parts of the same judicial system. To some
extent, the majority opinion in Stewart supports this interpretation; it refers
to the forum selection clause as "represent[ing] the parties' agreement as to
the most proper forum" and treats it as a relevant factor in the § 1404 analy-
sis. 139 There are, however, serious difficulties with concluding that policies
supporting convenience underlie a congressional choice to enforce selection
clauses.
First, at the time of contract negotiation, the contours of future litigation
cannot be known to the parties. Without knowing where the dispute arose,
what the dispute is about, and what evidence is likely to be relevant, it is
hard to imagine a reasoned determination about convenient locale except to
the extent that "convenience" is equated with "at my home." Second, the
parties, even if they could predict their future disagreement, are unlikely to
take into account any convenience beyond their own. As does the literal
language of § 1404, the identified procedural policy would logically rely on
the court as the decisionmaker best equipped to balance the competing inter-
ests of the parties, witnesses, and system.
The history of the Stewart case on remand is instructive. The United
States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, using a tradi-
tional § 1404 analysis, refused to transfer the case to the Southern District of
New York, finding that since neither Alabama nor New York was demon-
strably more convenient than the other, the presumption in favor of the
137. Focusing on "the virtually unflagging obligation of the federal courts to exercise the
jurisdiction given them," Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S.
800, 817 (1976), would lead to the unenforceability of forum selection clauses, while focusing
on assorted but distinguishable abstention doctrines could result in enforceability for compet-
ing policy reasons. See infra notes 136-49 and accompanying text (discussing the enforceabil-
ity of forum selection clauses for competing policy reasons).
138. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 616 (1964) (stating the purpose of § 1404), su-
perseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Ross v. Colorado Outward Bound Sch., Inc.,
822 F.2d 1524 (10th Cir. 1987).
139. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 31 (1988).
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plaintiff's choice had not been overcome.'" The United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed, 14 ' reasoning that the existence of
a valid forum selection clause shifted the burden of persuasion to the party
attempting to circumvent the clause, a burden that party could meet only
upon a showing of exceptional circumstances.142 In determining that defer-
ence to the plaintiff's alternative choice was inappropriate, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit noted that "[s]uch deference.., would only encourage parties to violate
their contractual obligations, the integrity of which are vital to our judicial
system. '1 43 And there's the rub. The policy competing with the historical
procedural concern of protecting the existence of subject matter jurisdiction
is not a procedural policy directing litigation to the most convenient forum
as pre-determined by the parties. Rather, it is a substantive choice about the
sanctity of contractual obligation, untied by § 1404 to any regulatory power
of Congress.'"
140. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 696 F. Supp. 583 (N.D. Ala. 1988), mandamus
granted, 870 F.2d 570 (1 1th Cir. 1989).
141. In re Ricoh Corp., 870 F.2d 570 (1 1th Cir. 1989). In a similar situation, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reached an opposite conclusion. Heller Fin.,
Inc. v. Midwhey Powder Co., 883 F.2d 1286 (7th Cir. 1989). The Seventh Circuit held that
§ 1404 did not compel the transfer of a case in accordance with a forum selection clause when
such a transfer would serve neither the interests of justice nor the convenience of witnesses,
although the court did agree that the clause was dispositive with respect to arguments regard-
ing the convenience of the parties. Id. at 1293; see also Red Bull Assocs. v. Best W. Int'l, 862
F.2d 963, 967 (2d Cir. 1988) (refusing to transfer a racial discrimination claim in accordance
with a forum selection clause because to do so would inhibit enforcement of civil rights laws by
local "'private attorney[s] general' ").
142. Ricoh, 870 F.2d at 573-74. Such exceptional circumstances apparently do not include
contrary public policy in the forum in which suit was instituted, although the Supreme Court
in The Bremen stated that such a policy would preclude enforcement. The Bremen v. Zapata,
Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1972). No such federal policy, of course, was found in The
Bremen, where the Court noted that the claim arose in international rather than U.S. waters.
Id. at 15. In the absence of admiralty or interstate commerce ties, the policy precluding en-
forcement, the ouster of jurisdiction, was specifically rejected. The remaining issue left open
by the Court-whether contrary state policy would preclude enforcement-was ultimately ad-
dressed in Stewart. The initial Court of Appeals opinion in Stewart held that state policies
were irrelevant. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 779 F.2d 643, 649 (1 1th Cir.), vacated, 785
F.2d 896 (1 1th Cir. 1986) (en banc), aff'd, 487 U.S. 22 (1988). However, a subsequent en banc
opinion held that the clause would not be enforceable if it contravened a strong state policy,
but found that the state's concern was limited to protecting the jurisdiction of its own courts.
Stewart Org. Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 810 F.2d 1066, 1069-70 (11 th Cir. 1987) (en banc), aff'd,
487 U.S. 22 (1988).
143. Ricoh, 870 F.2d at 573 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
144. Opinions by the Supreme Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Elev-
enth Circuit have looked to the importance of contractual obligation in dealing with such
clauses. One judge noted:
The enforceability of contract provisions is typically an issue of substance which a
federal court sitting in its diversity jurisdiction must decide according to state law.
The correctness of venue in the federal court system is, on the other hand, a proce-
dural matter that is governed by federal statutes and rules of procedure.
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That the enforceability of forum selection clauses is a function of contract
law rather than a device to ensure procedural convenience is clearly revealed
by the way in which federal courts determine the validity of such clauses.
Traditional notions of contract law require that the clause govern unless
there was fraud, undue influence, or the presence of overweening bargaining
power. '45 Therefore, if the clause is determined to have been freely and
fairly negotiated between parties of similar stature, it is valid.'" Considera-
tions of convenience play no role in the analysis.147 Interestingly, the court
Stewart, 779 F.2d at 651 (Godbold, C.J., dissenting). Another judge stated: "I find it self-
evident that the interests of justice would best be served by respecting a valid contract." Stew-
art, 810 F.2d at 1074 (Tjofiat, J., concurring). When the case reached the Supreme Court,
Justice Kennedy noted that "enforcement of valid forum-selection clauses, bargained for by
the parties, protects their legitimate expectations and furthers vital interests of the justice sys-
tem." Stewart, 487 U.S. at 33 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
145. The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 12; see also ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS
§ 6, at 10 (2d ed. 1982). The Supreme Court justified its decision to abandon the traditional
jurisdictional concern by reference to the international "expansion of American business and
industry," The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 9, and "ancient concepts of freedom of contract," id. at 11.
Although arising in admiralty, the determination of the validity of any forum selection clause
under federal law is made in accordance with The Bremen's standard.
146. Ricoh, 870 F.2d at 573.
147. It is true that the Eleventh Circuit, in determining on remand the validity of the
forum selection clause involved in Stewart, did refer to the "reasonableness" of the choice in
light of the defendant's incorporation in the chosen forum. Id. However, no consideration
was given to what weight that factor might have in a balanced analysis of convenience. Cer-
tainly, alone it makes New York no more "reasonable" than Alabama, the plaintiff's home
state.
Furthermore, the governing standard from The Bremen explicitly recognizes that the con-
tractual choice of forum may create serious inconveniences for the contracting parties, and the
parties may address such issues prior to contracting. The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 17. While the
Bremen Court acknowledged that a contractual choice to resolve an essentially local dispute in
an alien forum might indicate a contract of adhesion, the facts of the case demonstrate the
difficulty of such an argument. Id. at 2-8. The disputed contract involved parties from Texas
and Germany and dealt with the towing of a Texas drilling rig from Louisiana to Italy. Id. at
2-3. The rig was damaged in the Gulf of Mexico (international waters) and towed to Florida,
where suit was brought in federal district court. Id. at 3-4. The forum stipulated by the
contract was London and the Supreme Court enforced the contractual requirement. Id. at 2,
20. Lack of contact with the chosen forum is therefore not determinative. Given the facts of
the case, the result is not overly troubling. It is likely that both parties bargained extensively.
The Texas party did not challenge the clause, id. at 3, and since English law was less favorable
to it than was the law of the United States, it seems probable that the Texas party perceived
some off-setting advantage, possibly the likelihood of litigation in a German court in the ab-
sence of contrary contractual selection. More troublesome, however, is the Court's analogous
reliance on National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964), for the propo-
sition that a contractual provision appointing a citizen within a particular forum to act as a
contracting party's agent for service of process may support the forum's exercise of personal
jurisdiction over the contacting party in the absence of constitutionally required contacts be-
tween the contracting party and the forum state. The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 10-11. As a general
proposition, the statement is inarguably true. However, as suggested by the four dissenting
Justices, the facts in Szukhent certainly raise at least an inference that the provision was one of
adhesion. Szukhent involved a corporate lessor of equipment suing individual non-resident
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also does not ordinarily consider whether, absent such a clause, the chosen
forum would be one that could assert personal jurisdiction over the defend-
ant 48 or one that could convincingly deny a motion to transfer under
§ 1404. Apparently, enforcement of the parties' choice of forum is appropri-
ate in the same universe of circumstances as enforcement of their choice of
purchase price. 14
9
Before turning to the constitutionality of congressional action relating to
forum selection clauses under its power to create inferior federal courts, it
should be noted that Stewart left unresolved the issue of forum selection
clause enforceability in situations not governed by § 1404. Absent a federal
question, clauses that specify a foreign tribunal would clearly seem to be
governed by state law. Whatever the limits on congressional authority, Con-
lessees in the forum state of the corporate home, based on a printed form contract appointing
an "agent" in the forum state unknown to the lessee and possibly related to the lessor. Szuk-
hent, 375 U.S. at 313-14. In situations where the parties are unequal in terms of bargaining
power, if the Court would nonetheless uphold an exclusive forum selection clause, the Szuk-
hent difficulty is exacerbated.
148. But see Bryant Elec. Co. v. City of Fredericksburg, 762 F.2d 1192 (4th Cir. 1985)
(refuting the plaintiff's argument that the Bremen standard applied by the state justified not
enforcing the clause, and noting that the selection of the defendant's home state, which could
exercise general jurisdiction, was therefore presumptively reasonable); cf Seward v. Devine,
888 F.2d 957 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that in determining whether the forum selected by the
controlling clause was to be interpreted as the sole forum in which litigation was to proceed, a
non-exclusive interpretation would render the clause meaningless since the defendant was sub-
ject to general jurisdiction in the forum state); Sterling Forest Assocs. v. Barnett-Range Corp.,
840 F.2d 249 (4th Cir. 1988) (same).
149. For an insightful critique of this approach, see Linda S. Mullenix, Another Choice of
Forum, Another Choice of Law. Consensual Adjudicatory Procedure in Federal Court, 57
FORDHAM L. REV. 291 (1988).
The mix-and-match balancing of procedural and substantive policies, however, should not
be assumed necessarily to guarantee the victory of substance over procedure. While the "sanc-
tity of contract" outweighs the "ouster of jurisdiction," the former is in turn outweighed by
procedural policies against interlocutory appeals. Thus, if a district court refuses to dismiss a
case based on compliance with a forum selection clause, the frustrated defendant could no
more maintain an immediate appeal than if the grounds of dismissal were purely procedural.
Lauro Lines s.r.l. v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495, 499 (1989). The majority opinion in Lauro focused
on the requirement that in order to permit interlocutory review, the lower court's decision
must be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. Id. at 498. Because the
right at issue is exemption from trial only within a specified forum, the requirement is not met.
Id. at 500. Confronted with the argument that The Bremen evidences the contrary view that
trial is only available within the specified forum, the Lauro majority held that the policy went
to the merits of the right, not to its "precise contours." Id. at 501. Frankly, I do not under-
stand their reponse. Perhaps Justice Scalia's concurring opinion posed the issue more starkly:
how "important" are the competing policies. Id. at 502-03 (Scalia, J., concurring). In opting
for a bar against interlocutory appeals, however, Justice Scalia assumes that the policies sup-
porting immediate review are the same as those that would support similar review from alleged
statutory or treaty jurisdictional rights. Id. at 503. Since interlocutory appeals are not al-
lowed in those instances, none should be allowed when the right springs from private contract.
The sanctity of contractual obligation, however, remains unresolved.
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gress has statutorily restrained the district courts by commanding that in
non-federal question claims, district courts must use state law as "rules of
decision."' 5° As interpreted by the Supreme Court, if the difference between
state and proposed federal common law would lead parties to shop for the
federal forum, state law is to be followed as a "rule[ ] of decision."'' If a
state would not enforce the clause but the federal court would, obviously the
party wishing to litigate abroad would choose, presumably through re-
moval,'52 the federal forum. 153
Prior to Stewart and its reliance on § 1404, at least two federal circuit
courts of appeals considered the enforceability of clauses specifying a state
forum to be a question of state law.' 54 Logically, outside the context of
150. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1988).
151. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465 (1965).
152. To the extent that the Supreme Court's concern with forum shopping is that not all
parties have the opportunity to select a federal forum, specifically those whose dispute is either
not with completely diverse opponents or not worth more than $50,000, that concern is exacer-
bated in the present context. No reasonable plaintiff confronted with a foreign forum-selection
clause would file suit in a court sure to dismiss her complaint. But see Sibaja v. Dow Chem.
Co., 757 F.2d 1215 (1 1th Cir.) (affirming the dismissal of a foreign plaintiff's complaint due to
the federal doctrine of forum non conveniens, although under Florida law such dismissal
would be improper because one of the parties was a state resident), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 948
(1985). Defendants, not plaintiffs, will forum shop. But only defendants who qualify for di-
versity jurisdiction, are not from the forum state, or are not joined with other defendants from
the forum state, may engage in removal. It is unlikely that a local defendant would wish to
enforce a foreign forum-selection clause; it does not, however, seem improbable that a foreign
defendant joined with a local defendant would wish to do so. Today, of course, most states
enforce at least some foreign forum-selection clauses, although Alabama, Florida, Georgia,
Missouri, and Texas apparently do not. See Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Foster, 382 So.2d 554
(Ala. 1980); Zurich Ins. Co. v. Allen, 436 So.2d 1094 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983), review denied,
446 So.2d 100 (Fla. 1984); Cartidge Rental Network v. Video Entertainment, Inc., 209 S.E. 2d
132 (Ga. Ct. App. 1974); State ex rel. Gooseneck Trailer Mfg. v. Barker, 619 S.W.2d 928 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1981); Dowling v. NADW Mktg., 631 S.W.2d 726 (Tex. 1982). If the state enforces
the same clauses that the federal court would enforce, the choice of state or federal law be-
comes one of purely academic interest. See, e.g., Coastal Steel v. Tilghman Wheelabrator Ltd.,
709 F.2d 190 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 938 (1983). The problem remains significant
because the tests employed by the courts are not uniform.
153. Cf Alexander Proudfoot Co. World Hqtrs. v. Thayer, 877 F.2d 912, 917-19 (1 th Cir.
1989) (using the same logic to justify the use of state law to determine the validity of a contrac-
tual consent to personal jurisdiction). See generally Robert A. de By, Note, Forum Selection
Clauses: Substantive or Procedural for Erie Purposes, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1068 (1989).
154. Karl Koch Erecting Co. v. New York Convention Ctr. Dev. Corp., 838 F.2d 656 (2d
Cir. 1988); General Eng'g Corp. v. Martin Marietta Alumina, Inc., 783 F.2d 352 (3d Cir.
1986). Until 1988, the position of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
was unclear. See infra notes 157-63 and accompanying text. Compare Colonial Leasing Co. v.
Pugh Bros. Garage, 735 F.2d 380 (9th Cir. 1984) (using state law) with Pelleport Investors,
Inc. v. Budco Quality Theaters, Inc., 741 F.2d 273 (9th Cir. 1984) (utilizing the standard
enunciated in The Bremen) and Crown Beverage Co. v. Cerveceria Moctezuma, S.A., 663 F.2d
886 (9th Cir. 1981) (same) and Republic Int'l v. Amco Eng'rs, Inc. 516 F.2d 161 (9th Cir.
1975) (same).
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§ 1404 state law would presumably still be thought to govern.155 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, however, explicitly
held in Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v. Guicci America, Inc. 156 that federal law con-
trols. The court stated:
We conclude that the federal procedural issues raised by form se-
lection clauses significantly outweigh the state interests, and the
federal rule announced in The Bremen controls enforcement of fo-
rum clauses in diversity cases. Moreover, because enforcement of a
forum clause necessarily entails interpretation of the clause before
it can be enforced, federal law also applies to interpretation of fo-
rum selection clauses.
15 7
Two other circuits seem to assume such control.1 58
The Ninth Circuit's opinion initially appears at least to focus on proce-
dural rather than contractual policies. It acknowledges the role played in its
determination to use federal common law by the desire to avoid forum shop-
ping, relies on the fact that this goal must be balanced against others, 159 and
concludes that a federal procedural interest in uniform venue rules out-
weighs an undefined state interest.160 Nowhere does the court, however,
consider the balance between an interest in uniformity and the interest in
avoiding forum shopping. Since the use of federal common law as opposed
155. See supra notes 113-32 and accompanying text (discussing the application of § 1404 in
Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22 (1988)).
156. 685 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1988).
157. Id. at 513 (citation omitted). The Manetti-Farrow court canvassed various opinions
from the United States circuit courts of appeals on forum-selection clauses as of 1988. Id. at
512-13.
158. See Commerce Consultants Int'l v. Vetrerie Riunite, S.p.A., 867 F.2d 697, 698-99
(D.C. Cir. 1989); Citro Florida, Inc. v. Citrovale, S.A., 760 F.2d 1231, 1232 (1 1th Cir. 1985).
The position of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit was exemplified by
its opinion in Stewart, Org. v. Ricoh Corp. 810 F.2d 1066 (1 1th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 487 U.S. 22
(1988).
159. The court cited Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525 (1958), for the
proposition that the federal interest in utilizing federal law is to be balanced against the state
interest in the use of state law. Manetti-Farrow, 858 F.2d at 513. Although common, this
reading of Byrd is simply wrong. In Byrd, the Supreme Court focused on the interest of South
Carolina in having a judge rather than a jury decide whether the plaintiff was a statutory
employee of the defendant in deciding whether state law was "bound up with [state-created]
rights and obligations in such a way that its application in the federal court is required." Byrd,
356 U.S. at 535. Concluding that the choice of decisionmaker was historically fortuitous, the
Byrd Court considered separately whether the procedural (as opposed to constitutional) con-
cern of Erie to avoid forum-shopping mandated the use of state law. Id. at 536-37. The Court
resolved the question by applying a balancing test, but balanced conflicting federal procedural
policies: the desire to avoid forum shopping against an "essential characteristic" of an "in-
dependent system of administering justice," specifically the distribution of "trial functions be-
tween judge and jury." Id. at 537. Nowhere did the Court attempt to balance state and
federal interests.
160. Manetti-Farrow, 858 F.2d at 513.
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to state law would always promote uniformity, it is difficult to understand
just when state law would be followed. More troublesome, however, is the
Ninth Circuit's relatively uncritical acceptance of uniformity of venue rules
as an unquestionably legitimate systemic goal. 1 ' The trouble lies on two
levels.
First, the court relies on the opinion of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit in Stewart v. Ricoh Corp. 162 Stewart, in turn, relied
on the existence of statutory venue provisions and federal rules regarding
waiver of the defense, as well as the effect of a dismissal for improper venue
in subsequent litigation between the parties, to conclude that "Congress con-
sidered this a question appropriately governed by federal legal standards.,
163
The logic that led the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits to conclude that making
systemic choices in the absence of party choices necessarily implies a desire
to regulate the effect of those party choices is elusive at best. Both courts
seem to imply that Congress intended to preempt all state laws touching on
venue. Otherwise, the Rules of Decision Act16" would arguably preclude the
creation of federal common law, but the courts failed to apply any preemp-
tion analysis and, even if they did so, such analysis does not lead to the
courts' conclusion.165 Second, assuming that Congress did intend that all
questions affecting venue in the federal system be decided pursuant to a uni-
form body of federal law, the source of authority supporting that intent
raises issues of power and federalism. Unquestionably, in the absence of in-
volvement by the parties, Congress may, under its Article I authority, di-
rectly allocate or permit the courts to fashion common law to allocate the
judicial business of the federal system among various inferior courts in any
rational manner it chooses. However, equally unquestionable is the fact that
a desire for uniformity alone is not sufficient to uphold federal lawmaking.
No matter how strongly the federal system desires uniform results in all tort
cases within its subject matter jurisdiction, for example, to achieve that re-
sult there must be a supporting grant of authority within Article I of the
161. Id.
162. 810 F.2d 1066 (1lth Cir. 1987), aff'd, 487 U.S. 22 (1988).
163. Id. at 1068.
164. Rules of Decision Act, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 944 (1948) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1652 (1982)).
165. See generally GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 291-305 (12th ed. 1991)
(discussing the preemption of state authority, trends in preemption cases, and consent to state
laws). It is difficult to characterize the assorted venue provisions as a pervasive federal regula-
tory scheme. The federal interest in the private parties' choice of the forum for litigation
hardly seems "dominant" and, in any event, may be misplaced in the procedural context. See
supra note 130 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Scalia's disagreement with federal
preemption in the area of forum selection). There is no necessary or even implicit inconsis-
tency between the use of the federal provisions, which nowhere deal with the instant situation,
and state law regarding the enforceability of forum-selection clauses.
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Constitution. The goal of uniformity justifies the choice of generic federal
venue statutes over adoption of state laws, but the ability to choose at all
depends on the ability to create inferior federal courts. Once the parties
attempt to control the choice of forum through private agreements, other
considerations beyond procedural regulation are brought into play. Thus, as
in Stewart, the question arises of whether and how Congress may take into
account substantive policies in crafting apparently procedural rules.
For more than fifty-five years, it has been accepted that in attempting to
achieve procedural goals, Congress may consider and reject substantive poli-
cies that cut against those goals.' 66 This is problematic unless Congress has
an independent grant of authority to judge the substantive policies and is
questionable because of its impact on the political ability of states to resist
incursions into areas traditionally left to local governance.' 67 The forum
selection clause fact pattern, however, raises precisely the opposite problem.
Neither Congress nor the Supreme Court concluded that the systemic inter-
est in determining whether and in what cases litigation may proceed requires
that if jurisdiction and venue are properly invoked, a court may not be
"ousted" of that jurisdiction by a private contractual agreement, even
though substantive policies of contractual obligation are thereby rejected.
Instead, the Supreme Court-and, according to the Court, Congress-has
concluded that the importance of enforcing valid contractual agreements is
paramount, a determination enforced under the rubric of a "procedural"
choice, albeit a substantive determination nonetheless. Even if it is necessary
and proper to reject a substantive policy competing with a procedural goal in
regulating inferior federal courts, it does not follow that it is necessary and
proper to consider and accept such a substantive policy to supplant a proce-
dural goal in regulating inferior federal courts. The achievement of substan-
tive policy is not a subset of subject matter jurisdiction; it is a result of
regulatory authority vested in Congress by other constitutional clauses and
as such, should be grounded there. To do so assures that both Congress and
the states realize the impact of the choice, and such realization may lead to
legislative rejection of the substantive choice.
If the state choice displaced by the federal enforcement of forum selection
clauses is a procedural one, the federalism concern underlying the argument
thus far may be muted. The state's concern is thought to be the protection
of its courts' jurisdiction and may simply not be implicated if the jurisdic-
tional ouster affects federal court jurisdiction. 61 It is, however, conceivable
166. See supra notes 98-109 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
168. The identical argument convinced the Eleventh Circuit in Stewart that no strong state
public policy would be offended by the enforcement of the clause. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh,
810 F.2d 1066, 1069-70 (11th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 487 U.S. 22 (1988). See generally Allan R.
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that the refusal to enforce such clauses is a reflection of a state desire to keep
local courts open for suits brought there by local residents. Such a desire
would undoubtedly also be classified as procedural. In order to cast it as
substantive, the state would need to argue that local courts are biased in
favor of local plaintiffs, thus effectively reducing their burden of proof. Such
an argument is unlikely to be made. But the justification of assumed conven-
ience could be bolstered by considerations of procedural fairness: a local resi-
dent whose tax dollars support the court system and whose vote may elect its
judges is entitled to claim the services of that system and those judges when
jurisdictional rules permit. In such an instance, the state's interest in re-
sisting displacement of its procedural choice parallels its interest in main-
taining substantive choices and supports the conclusion that, if displacement
is to occur, it should at least be achieved openly.
However, the use of federal law in this context is not limited to the general
question of whether any forum selection clauses should be enforced. Federal
law also determines how such clauses should be interpreted and which
clauses should be enforceable. If, as is the norm, a state agrees with the
proposition that not all such clauses are void as against public policy, 69 it
retains an interest in the use of its substantive contract law. It is in this
situation that the use of contrary federal law, allegedly grounded in Con-
gress's control over the procedure of federal courts, is most offensive. Con-
gress is imposing substantive choices under a procedural guise that
contradicts substantive choices consciously made as such by the state.
Surely even a federalism necessitating only political protection need not
countenance that intrusion. If Congress wishes to impose its own choice in
this situation, it must do so truthfully, pursuant to its power under the Com-
merce Clause. It should not be permitted by the courts to impose such a
choice on states either under the rubric of § 1404 or as a misperceived spe-
cies of "interstitial" procedural common law.
Stein, Erie and Court Access, 100 YALE L.J. 1935 (1991) (arguing that federalism requires
consideration of the impact of federal rules regarding access to federal courts on state regula-
tory policies).
169. See The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 10 (1972) (holding that forum-
selection clauses are prima facie valid and enforceable unless unreasonable). But see Redwing
Carriers, Inc. v. Foster, 382 So.2d 554, 556 (Ala. 1980) (holding contract provisions that at-
tempt to limit jurisdiction to be invalid and unenforceable as against public policy). States
holding forum-selection clauses unenforceable as against public policy include Alabama, Flor-
ida, Georgia, Missouri and Texas. Julia L. Erickson, Comment, Forum Selection Clauses in
Light of the Erie Doctrine and Federal Common Law: Stewart Organization v. Ricoh Corpora-
tion, 72 MINN. L. REV 1090, 1095 n.28 (1988).
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B. Preclusion Doctrines
The preclusive effect federal courts give to state court judgments is gov-
erned by statute, 170 and is determined by reference to the preclusive effect
the judgment would have under the preclusion law of the state which ren-
dered it. 17 ' However, the preclusive effect to be given federal court judg-
ments is a matter of controversy when the judgment whose effect is to be
determined was rendered in a case arising under state law. 7 2 Some federal
circuit courts use federal common law,' 73 while others use state law.' 74 A
circuit court may first look to the precise issue to be decided before choos-
ing. 17  Leading commentators are similarly divided.' 7 6 In the context of
political federalism, the question arises as to whether Congress could, under
its authority to create inferior federal courts, establish rules of preclusion to
be used by federal courts when such courts must determine the effect of any
170. Title 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982) states, in relevant part: "Such Acts, records and judicial
proceedings [of any state] ... shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the
United States ... as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State... from which they
are taken." Article IV of the United States Constitution addresses the preclusive effect state
court judgments are to be given by other states and is not implicated when the second case is
being heard by a federal court. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1
171. Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 379 (1985);
Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 481-82 (1982). For an argument that the
preclusive effect of a judgment rendered by a state court should usually be determined not by
the preclusionary law of the state, but rather, by the preclusionary law that the state itself
would apply, see Stephen B. Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, Full Faith and Credit and
Federal Common Law: A General Approach, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 733, 797-829 (1986).
172. In non-diversity cases, the Supreme Court has held that uniform federal preclusion
rules apply. See United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 158 (1984); Parklane Hosiery Co. v.
Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 327 (1979). Professor Burbank provides a justification for the use in this
situation of federal common law while criticizing the Court for its laconic decisions. Burbank,
supra note 190, at 762-78.
173. See, e.g., Harett v. Billman, 800 F.2d 1308 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 932
(1987); Empire Fire & Marine Ins. v. J. Transport, Inc., 880 F.2d 1291 (11th Cir. 1989);
Terrell v. De Conna, 877 F.2d 1267 (5th Cir. 1989); Gelb v. Royal Globe Ins., 798 F.2d 38 (2d
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 948 (1987).
174. See, e.g., Ford v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 928 F.2d 1118, 1121 (11th Cir. 1991);
Tiernan v. DeVoe, 923 F.2d 1024 (3d Cir. 1991); Costantini v. Trans World Airlines, 681 F.2d
1199 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1087 (1982); Gasbarra v. Park-Ohio Indus., 655 F.2d
119 (7th Cir. 1981); Semler v. Psychiatric Institute, 575 F.2d 922 (D.C. Cir. 1978); see also
Answering Serv., Inc. v. Egan, 728 F.2d 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1984). But see Hunt v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 707 F.2d 1493 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
175. See, e.g., Lowell Staats Mining Co. v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 878 F.2d 1271 (10th Cir.
1989); Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Mobile Aerial Towers, Inc., 723 F.2d 50 (8th Cir.
1983).
176. Professor Burbank argues that a proper understanding of the relationship between the
Rules of Decision Act, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 944 (1948) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1652
(1982) and federal judicial power (or lack thereof) to craft common law ordinarily compels the
usage of state law. Burbank, supra note 171, at 797. But see Ronan E. Degnan, Federalized
Res Judicata, 85 YALE L.J. 741, 772-73 (1976) (concluding that federal law should define the
preclusive effects of federal judgments).
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prior judgment in the forum court or the effect of prior federal forum judg-
ments in subsequent state court litigation.
While the number of paradigm situations raised by the first inquiry alone
suggests that the answers might be staggeringly complex, in fact, today's
complexity is in choosing appropriate policies, not in determining the federal
authority to choose. Under current doctrine, authority in both situations is
unassailable. Preclusion rules serve vital procedural interests not only in the
system that renders the judgment but also in the system where the judgment
is sought to be used. The central concern is with the fair and efficient use of
judicial resources. Laws reflecting a policy judgment as to whether limited
federal judicial resources should or should not be expended when litigants
have already engaged in a related battle may be characterized as procedural,
as are laws reflecting a desire to make initial use of the federal system more
efficient by encouraging or discouraging joinder of claims.177 However, the
further question of what effect such laws would have on state policies also
needs to be asked in order to determine whether reliance on procedural
power is truly sufficient.
If the state court rendered the judgment whose effect is to be determined,
the state system ordinarily has an overriding interest in determining what
Professor Steven Burbank has called the "preconditions to preclusion": the
validity and finality of its judgments. 178 The most basic concepts of sover-
eignty demand that the judgment neither be given life by a different sover-
eign nor be totally disregarded by a different sovereign against the will of the
rendering state. 179 The other situation in which federal courts refer to state
law when they ordinarily utilize federal law to determine the preclusive ef-
fect of prior judgments involves defining legal terms considered to have rele-
vance above and beyond their use in the preclusion context."8 ° Privity is a
prime example. 81 If the federal preclusion rules make privity relevant, the
177. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text (discussing judicial restrictions on the
scope of Title IX's non-discrimination mandate).
178. Burbank, supra note 171, at 764. To some extent, however, the validity of a state
judgment is a function of federal law. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
restrains the states' ability to assert personal jurisdiction, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, and the
Constitution also precludes states from discriminating against claims that arise under the laws
of other states or the federal law. See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 393 (1947). Furthermore,
by vesting exclusive jurisdiction in federal courts, Congress may deprive state courts of juris-
diction to hear claims arising under federal law. However, what constitutes a final judgment
on the merits and the validity of jurisdictional assertions under state law are also necessary
preconditions to preclusion.
179. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 81 cmt. a (1982).
180. Prior federal court judgments based on state law claims are the only ones in which this
option is currently available. See supra notes 172-76 and accompanying text.
181. See Federal Ins. Co. v. Gates Learjet Corp., 823 F.2d 383, 386 (10th Cir. 1987) (stat-
ing that "where the question is whether there is privity between the parties in different diver-
sity suits, a federal court must apply state rules of privity").
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issue of whether such reference is required appears to depend on whether the
state definition of privity in the context of preclusion is the same as its defini-
tion of privity in areas of substantive concern,' s2 and whether the use of a
federal definition in the preclusion decision would negate the state's ability
to achieve its other ends. If it would, Congress should be forced to rely on
some other regulatory power to displace the state choice.
However, beyond these two possible and relatively narrow constraints on
congressional power looms a larger concern: the potential substantive as well
as procedural goals of preclusion rules. Even if judicial resources were
unlimited, it is difficult to understand how prior judgments could have no
preclusive effect. Finality of judgment is considered an independent good
from the point of view of both the system and the litigants. The authority of
a court's judgment would be eviscerated and the judicial system undermined
if no relitigation of anything between any parties was barred. Though each
successive judgment could theoretically be enforced, such enforcement
would waste judicial resources if it failed, at the very least, to preclude en-
forcement of the opposite judgment between the same parties. This systemic
goal is comfortably within Congress's power to achieve for the courts it cre-
ates. To the extent that the preclusion rules displace a different state method
designed to achieve the same goal, no problem arises. However, finality also
serves to guarantee repose for litigants, a goal that could only be properly
pursued by the system governing the primary activity with which the first
judgment was concerned. '83 The fact that this is not a policy Congress may
pursue if the first judgment involved a claim arising under state law does not
invalidate the other procedural goals appropriate for congressional consider-
182. If they are not, then only the goals of the state respecting preclusion would be ham-
pered by use of a federal definition. See infra notes 185-86 and accompanying text (discussing
whether the federal trumping of those goals is inappropriate).
183. Burbank, supra note 171, at 792. The author has some concern with defining litigant
repose as substantive in the relevant sense, although she agrees that if it is indeed substantive,
it must flow from the substantive conclusion of the first litigation as some sort of "prize."
Presumably, the goal is seen as non-procedural, and therefore substantive, because it is not
concerned with litigation activity but with the out-of-courtroom aftermath. Unlike other sub-
stantive goals, however, it is not designed to govern primary activity or to foster certain kinds
of relationships.
An analogous issue arose when the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
interpreted 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a) (as amended in 1982) to require that the United States Treas-
ury Bill rate, rather then state law, govern the rate at which post-judgment interest in all civil
cases is calculated. Forest Sales Corp. v. Bedingfield, 881 F.2d 111 (4th Cir. 1989). Recogniz-
ing that the measure of damages is usually considered substantive, the court differentiated
post-judgment interest as procedural because it arises after the dispute triggered litigation, is
not part of planning out-of-court business activity, and confirms no right in and of itself but
rather follows and operates on the substance of determined rights. Id. at 113. If repose is not
substantive in the relevant sense, congressional power truly is as broad as today's doctrine
would permit.
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ation. However, if the state purpose is to achieve such repose, it is arguable
that a court may not properly set aside the state's attempt by referring solely
to procedural authority. 18 4 It makes no difference whether the first judg-
ment was rendered in a state or federal court, because in either event federal
procedural law supplants state substantive choice.
Admittedly, the assault on state sovereignty is less severe in the preclusion
context than it is in the context of forum selection clauses. In the context of
preclusion rules, Congress is achieving a procedural end through use of its
power to regulate federal procedure-albeit at the expense of a state substan-
tive goal-rather than achieving a substantive goal through the guise of a
procedural rule.1 5 Yet in so doing, Congress is considering and rejecting
policy choices outside its authority to regulate. At the very least, such con-
sideration and rejection should be explicit in order to be effective." 6
A separate, but related issue to the question of congressional authority to
craft preclusion rules to be used by federal courts is the issue of congres-
sional authority to define the preclusive effect of judgments rendered by fed-
eral courts in subsequent state court litigation. In this latter context, general
congressional power cannot be thought to derive from its procedural regula-
tory authority, because the focus of that authority is only on the federal
courts. Thus, if the federal judgment was rendered on a claim arising under
state law, Congress may only insist that its use in a subsequent state proceed-
ing respect the federal definitions of validity and finality.' 87 If, however, the
federal judgment was rendered with respect to a claim arising under federal
law, the scope of congressional authority is more problematic.
184. See supra notes 114-15 and 133-35 and accompanying text.
185. See supra note 143-44 and accompanying text.
186. The decision that explicit federal law should be allowed to displace the alleged state
substantive choice is much less problematic than the testimonial privilege hypothetical. See
supra note 103 and accompanying text. In the first place, it is doubtful that either the federal
or state system is primarily or even secondarily motivated by notions of repose when it crafts
preclusion rules. We do not live in a world of unlimited judicial resources, and it would seem
that these rules instead reflect the judgement of a proper balance between the costs of repeti-
tious litigation on the one hand and the dangers of factually and legally complicated mega-
suits on the other. A related point is the extent to which choices that conflict in this context
really do so because of disagreements over what is necessary to protect the substantive rights of
the parties. Preclusion rules certainly do that, but it would seem to be a common minimum
requirement of any rational system. Any set of preclusionary rules will result in repose,
although in differing degrees, and in protection of the substantive rights reflected by the initial
judgment. The choice, after all, is not between state preclusion and no preclusion. It is appar-
ent, however, that if such replacement is to be tolerated, the Supreme Court should insist that
Congress consider and acknowledge the implications of its decision in order to allow the states
to defend their independence meaningfully.
187. See supra note 143-44 and accompanying text.
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Neither the Supremacy Clause' nor grants of substantive regulatory au-
thority justify congressional imposition of federal procedures on state courts
exercising jurisdiction over federal claims. 89 The Supremacy Clause itself
provides no independent federal grant of power; it merely sets out a hierar-
chy of otherwise constitutionally proper laws."9° Furthermore, the author-
ity to regulate and the authority to enforce judicially such regulation are
distinct, a proposition reflected in the constitutional structure which under-
lies the Court's decision in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins. 91 It follows that to
the extent preclusionary rules, which a federal court would use to determine
the effect of a prior federal decision on a federal claim, are based on proce-
dural concerns, Congress could not compel a state court to follow them.
Indeed, it is difficult to imagine why Congress would wish to do so because,
by definition, the rules are geared to the protection of systemic federal inter-
ests. On the other hand, if the rules are designed to insure repose, they find
their source in the substantive grant of authority underlying the primary
claim, and, should Congress choose to do so, it may impose them on the
states. Similarly, if procedural rules involve the definition of legal terms
with substantive relevance in other contexts that would be adversely affected
if a different definition were used here, Congress could insist upon their use
in the state litigation. The freedom of Congress to govern preclusion,
whether in federal or state courts, depends upon the substantive law source
of the decided claim and the goals that the creating system sought to serve
by its choice of preclusion rules applicable to that claim.
C. Settlement Agreements
The third paradigm of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins 92 involves the interpre-
tation of private settlement agreements regarding suits filed in federal court.
188. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
189. Margaret G. Stewart, Federalism and Supremacy: Control of State Judicial Decision-
Making, 68 CH1-KENT L. REv. 431, 436 n.20 (1992).
190. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
191. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Article I, section 8, clause 9 of the United States Constitution
specifically grants Congress the authority to create courts inferior to the Supreme Court. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9. The document does not assume, however, and nor did the members of
the Constitutional Convention believe, that federal judicial enforcement would be "necessary
and proper" to the execution of delegated regulatory powers. This distinction is currently
reflected in the refusal of the Supreme Court to permit Congress to establish Article I courts to
hear any case arising under federal law. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor,
478 U.S. 833, 851-52 (1986) (examining the grant of power to the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission against developed standards of judicial authority under the Constitution); North-
ern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 83-84 (1982) (holding that
Congress's action of vesting authority in Article I courts "suggest unwarranted encroachments
upon the judicial power of the United States, which our Constitution reserves for Art. III
courts").
192. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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There is general agreement that these contracts should be considered under
state law if the claim arose under state law 193 and under federal law if the
claim arose under federal law.194 The logic of this decision is apparently
thought to be obvious. In terms of congressional power it does not seem to
be so.
Merely because a contract refers to the effect of ending litigation in federal
court, it does not thereby become a document whose interpretation impli-
cates the procedural interests of the system.' 95 To suggest, as one court has,
that docket control and the assurance of fair dealing between parties before
the court justifies the use of federal law is to misconceive what procedural
interests are all about. 9 6 A desire to cut back on litigation is not a proce-
dural interest that permits the federal system to create substantive law. No
procedural interest can do that. The desire to assure fair dealing between the
parties, on the other hand, is a substantive goal shared by all cases arising
193. See, e.g., Jeff D. v. Andrus, 888 F.2d 617, 623 (9th Cir. 1989) ("The construction and
enforcement of settlement agreements are governed by principles of local law which apply to
interpretation of contracts generally."); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Kolb, 884 F.2d 486,
488 (9th Cir. 1989) (noting that in a diversity case, state law governs contractual issues); Con-
dit Chem. & Grain v. Helena Chem. Corp., 789 F.2d 1101, 1102-03 (5th Cir. 1986) (same); Lee
v. Hunt, 631 F.2d 1171, 1173-74 (5th Cir. 1980) (same), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 834 (1981). But
see Auer v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., 830 F.2d 535, 538 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding that state law
governs the effects of release in a prior federal suit on rights and duties of third parties, but
federal procedural interests necessitate the use of federal common law when the issue is the
validity of the agreement as between the settling parties), cert. denied sub nor. Ebaugh v.
Cessna Aircraft Co., 485 U.S. 945 (1988).
194. See, e.g., Gamewell Mfg. v. HVAC Supply, Inc., 715 F.2d 112, 114-15 (4th Cir. 1983)
(stating that "federal courts have frequently... opt[ed] ... for application of a uniform federal
rule"); cf American Lumber Corp. v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 886 F.2d 50, 54 (3d Cir.
1989) (noting that federal procedural law applied to party's claims in federal court); Fairfax
Countywide Citizens Ass'n v. County of Fairfax, 571 F.2d 1299, 1303 (4th Cir.) (recognizing
specific instances of the application of federal procedural law), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1047
(1978). But see United Commerical Ins. Serv., Inc. v. Paymaster Corp., 962 F.2d 853, 856 (9th
Cir. 1992) (holding that state law governs all settlement agreements).
195. One sort of "settlement agreement" does implicate those interests but it does not pur-
port actually to "end" the litigation between the "settling" parties. So-called "Mary Carter
agreements" permit the "settling" defendant to retain a financial interest in the plaintiff's re-
covery against other defendants while at the same time remaining a party at trial. BLACK'S
LAW DIcTIONARY 974 (6th ed. 1990). Texas recently joined a handful of other states in de-
claring such agreements void as against public policy because of their perceived adverse impact
on the trial process. Elbaor v. Smith, 845 S.W.2d 240, 250 (Tex. 1992). Such procedural
interests exist in the federal system as well. Nonetheless, if the contract would be considered
valid under otherwise applicable state law, reliance on that procedural interest should be insuf-
ficient to displace substantive principles of contract. And if the contract would be void under
state law, no general federal common law regarding the sanctity of contractual obligations can
be created to revive it.
196. Auer, 830 F.2d at 538. The specific suit raised the prior agreement as a defense; so-
called "docket control" is presumably thought relevant because a broader reading of the con-
tract will preclude more litigation in the federal forum. While this may be true, so too might
many other contract interpretations as well as rules of preclusion. See id.
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under contract law and can not even masquerade in the guise of a procedural
effort. On the other hand, if the contract is incorporated into a valid and
enforceable federal judgment, the question of when that judgment may be set
aside, assuming the contract's enforceability under state law, may raise ge-
neric questions about the finality of federal judgments. 97 Yet it is difficult
to see how the distinction could make a difference. Even assuming a hypo-
thetical case in which federal procedure would permit setting aside a judg-
ment based on a valid contract, the contractual rights of the parties could
still be enforced in a separate proceeding. The contract has created new
substantive rights and duties between the parties, and the courts must look
to substantive law to interpret them.
Any case raising this type of issue necessitates consideration of two
claims: the claim settled by the agreement and the currently pending claim,
in which the agreement either is sought to be enforced or is being raised as a
defense. Initially, it would seem appropriate that state law should govern
the agreement's interpretation if the settled claim arose under state law and
vice versa. To be sure, if the settled claim were federal, Congress could
develop laws to govern the settlement agreement as a species of regulation
necessary and proper to the execution of the law under which the claim
arose. '9 But the existence of any real federal interest in doing so depends
on the issue raised by the agreement, not on the law giving rise to the origi-
nal claim. Thus, if the agreement purports to settle a federal claim but is
based upon a party's unilateral mistake of fact, substantive policies such as
public interest in the enforcement of the underlying claim might well sup-
port use of federal law to permit recession.' 99 On the other hand, if the issue
involves the scope of a waiver as it affects bringing a state law claim, it is
difficult to see what substantive federal policies are implicated.2 "o A parallel
issue-dependent substantive federal interest exists if the settled claim arose
197. See supra note 178 and accompanying text. This distinction between the validity of
the contract and the setting aside of a judgment was drawn explicitly in White Farm Equip-
ment Co. v. Kupcho, 792 F.2d 526, 529 (5th Cir. 1986) ("Federal courts have the inherent
power to enforce settlement agreements entered into by the parties litigant in a pending case, to
determine compliance with procedural prerequisites, and to determine when, if ever, a party
may repudiate a contractually binding settlement agreement.").
198. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18
199. In Gamewell Manufacturing v. HVAC Supply, Inc. 715 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1983), the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit noted the possibility of precisely this
argument in a case brought to enforce a settlement agreement involving a patent infringement
claim. Id. at 114-15. Unfortunately, it cheerfully held that the issue of the need for uniformity
did not have to be so narrowly considered. Id. at 115. Instead, relying on undefined "proce-
dural interests," the court held that "the standards by which (litigation initiated in federal
courts] may be settled ... are preeminently a matter for resolution by federal common law
principles, independently derived." Id.
200. For a discussion of the role of rules of preclusion in this context, see supra notes 178-
184 and accompanying text.
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under state law. For example, if an agreement includes a waiver of a poten-
tial claim under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,201 the ability of the
plaintiff to execute such a waiver in the first place and the conditions under
which she may do so raise issues of substantive federal concern.2" 2 Thus, the
inquiry should focus on the impact of the contract on federal interests in the
federal claims affected by the agreement.
The above argument would clearly justify congressional regulation not
only of any settlement agreement reached with respect to a federal claim, but
also with respect to any settlement agreement purporting to affect the par-
ties' rights under federal law. However, contract interpretation is ordinarily
thought of as a function of state law. If the independent role of the state is to
be suppressed, it must be suppressed clearly and in reliance on something
other than procedural interests. Furthermore, the role of the courts in the
creation of such substantive but interstitial common law is troublesome be-
cause it relies so frequently on the wrong considerations. At the very least,
the focus must change to issues of substantive law.
IV. CONCLUSION
The unthinking acceptance by both Congress and the courts of congres-
sional substantive regulation through Congress's spending and procedural
powers continues to make it increasingly difficult for states to defend their
interest in governing local activity and, therefore, undermines the ideological
balance struck between federal and state interests by political federalism.
While it is not necessary to deny that such local activity may properly be
subject to national rule because of its national impact, it is necessary to em-
phasize that the imposition of such rule must be clearly acknowledged as
justified by some grant of authority similar to the Commerce Clause. To
require less is to hobble the states in any attempt to protect their sover-
eignty-a result as unfair under the logic of Garcia v. San Antonio Metropoli-
tan Transit Authority,2 °a as it is politically unwise.
201. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1988).
202. See, e.g., Davies v. Grossmont Union High Sch. Dist., 930 F.2d 1390, 1396 (9th Cir.)
(using federal common law to resolve the constitutionality of a waiver of the right to run for
public office within a court-approved settlement agreement), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2892
(1991). Since any such federal law would derive from Congress's substantive regulatory au-
thority, Congress could, and presumably would, compel the states to follow the same law if the
contract became relevant in a state court case.
203. 469 U.S. 528 (1985); see supra notes 9, 11, 15 and accompanying text.
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